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Abstract 
 
The issue of tax havens has re-emerged on the EU’s political and economic agenda over the 
past several years. This year (2014) it has adopted two important directives that aim to 
protect the member states by reducing the impacts of tax evasion and tax fraud through the 
use of tax havens. This project reviews why and how this phenomenon has occurred using a 
combination of policy narrative analysis and the concepts of depoliticisation and 
repoliticalisation. The aim of this project is to present the current policy narrative (which we 
name the Crucial Consolidation) used by the European Commission in order to explain the 
factors behind the repoliticisation of tax havens on their agenda.    
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 I. Introduction 
I.I. Problem Area  
As a result of the growing pace and intensity of globalisation and digitalisation, an increasing 
number of economic processes have an international dimension. Technological 
advancement to a digital economy now mean that companies can serve markets in 
jurisdictions where they are not physically present. As Sharman (2006:3) notes, many 
observers believe that the economic change caused by globalisation, particularly the rise in 
cross-border trade and financial flows, has far outpaced states’ capacities to control the 
process of globalisation itself subsequently raising fears surrounding global capitalism. 
Recent advances in communication, information and transport technology drive and combine 
with economic deregulation and liberalisation to provide the owners of capital with much 
more mobility than they previously had (Ibid). An increasing selection of services and goods 
are now produced in more locations, subsequently fostering competition between nations for 
investment. Consequently governments must now adopt market-friendly, or more narrowly, 
investor-friendly policies for fear of seeing capital relocate to other jurisdictions. As Sharman 
(Ibid) notes, not only does capital flight and disinvestment have serious ramifications on 
governments’ macroeconomic plans but it also undermines their capacity by eroding the tax 
base. Taxation is vital to economic sovereignty since if a government cannot tax effectively it 
cannot do much else.  
The extensive internationalisation of economic affairs, but in particular financial transactions 
has rendered individual nation states increasingly vulnerable to ‘tax competition’ between 
states as a means of encouraging transnational corporations to (re)locate their operations 
through foreign direct investment projects of simple profit-shifting (Genschel et al 2011; 
Rixen 2011 in Leaman and Waris 2013:4) The German Minister of Finance Wolfgang 
Schäuble (2014) argues that sources of income have become more mobile and there is an 
increasing focus on intangible assets and mobile investment income that can be easily 
‘optimised’ from a tax point of view and transferred abroad. His perspective epitomises the 
attitude that European high tax countries have towards taxation today. Schäuble proceeds to 
argue that tax legislation has not kept pace with the progression of such economic 
developments. Most tax allocation principles that apply today date back to a time when doing 
business internationally primarily meant transporting goods across a border to a 
neighbouring country (Ibid). Legislation and rules that were formulated in the primary 
decades of the 20th century are no longer appropriate for today’s international integration of 
economic processes and corporate structures. They need to be adapted to the economic 
reality of digital services (Ibid).    
Germany is not the only example of a European country which feels legislation concerning 
taxation issues must be addressed. As Leaman and Waris note (2013:1) the issue of tax 
justice has moved up the agenda of the most powerful developed states in the wake of the 
2008 global financial crisis. Along with recent tax evasion scandals, the crisis prompted calls 
for enhanced fairness and transparency in the global tax system. The issue of tax justice is 
now a hotly debated topic in European politics because of the actions that the European 
Commission (EC) and the Council of the European Union have implemented in order to 
combat both tax evasion and tax avoidance. Taxation in general is a topic that has gained 
increased attention all over the world. A prime example of this is Thomas Piketty’s amazingly 
popular book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, which proposes rather drastic reforms in 
taxation systems in order to curb worldwide inequality. It seems that taxation is losing some 
of its old notoriety as a barrier for the functioning of free markets, and its positive effects 
have gained a greater emphasis. 
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Palan et al. (2010:9–10) define tax evasion as an illegal activity of failing to declare one’s 
income whereas tax avoidance is a legal means of attempting to reduce one’s tax levels by 
using several different methods (See our Appendix 2 for the full definition). Although the 
latter practice is legal it is also controversial as many consider it to be unethical. Defining 
these terms is problematic because different legal systems identify the two practices 
differently. Therefore there is no agreed, universal definitions of the terms.  
Tax evasion and avoidance can be practiced on a national level by hiding income from the 
tax authorities. Introduction of free movement of capital and goods meant that both activities 
could be transferred to international level. Differentiated tax regimes of different countries 
create a situation where a corporation or an individual is able to exploit the weaknesses of 
the international tax system. Jurisdictions that provide low or zero levels of taxation provide 
the means for such exploitation and are common way of  facilitating tax evasion and tax 
avoidance. These jurisdictions are commonly known as tax havens. Although this project is 
primarily concerned with tax havens, it is essential to consider the practices of tax evasion 
and tax avoidance as they are the actions which tax havens facilitate. This project is not 
concerned with the practices of evasion and avoidance per se, but with their facilitation 
through tax havens. 
This facilitation of tax evasion has not remained a secret from the countries whose tax bases 
have been eroded by this activity. One of the first government initiatives launched against 
tax havens occurred in the US as early as during the Kennedy era (Rosenzweig 2010:97–5). 
However, more than half a century later there is still no effective solution to the problem of 
tax evasion through these controversial jurisdictions: tax havens are attracting vast amounts 
of investment (EC 2012a:10). Moreover, international cooperation on the issue has been 
historically weak. The Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
staged a campaign against harmful tax practices some 15 years ago but its results did not 
achieve what it had set out to do (Sharman 2006). Many authors such as Sharman (2006) 
and Palan (2013) suggest that the reason for the lack of international cooperation in the field 
of taxation is the hardships due to collective action problems. Even if a group of countries 
was able to initiate an agreement regarding cross border taxation policies, there would 
always be non-participants (free-riders) who seek to avoid such conformity and would see 
the situation as an opportunity that could be exploited for their own profitable gain. According 
to this logic, only a truly global approach to implementing tax policies would offer a realistic 
solution to these  tax issues. However, this is not a likely outcome now or in the immediate 
future since there is no international body which could set up and reinforce an international 
tax system. However, the increased attention paid to the tax issues has been materialised in 
new international developments implemented by the US, the EU and the OECD. 
This project focuses on the European Union’s approach to tax havens. There are three main 
reasons why we choose to adopt the EU as the centerpiece of our work. First, the EU 
provides a unique platform for deep cooperation in the field of economic policies. The 
member states, especially the ones using the common currency, the Euro, are used to 
having more cooperation between them than anywhere else in the world. These countries 
have already given significant parts of their economic autonomy away. If one group of 
nations is to overcome the collective action problems entrenched in the issue of tax havens, 
it is the EU. Additionally, the sheer size of the EU must be considered instrumental in 
formulating a solution. As a huge economic power and the home for more than 500 million 
people, the EU’s decisions have a significant global impact. However, 28 countries cannot 
make the rest of the world (over 150 countries) play by their rules. Even though the EU is a 
significant player in the global economy, it faces the same problems that any other country 
does, it has to compete with others.   
Second, Europe is in crisis. It is hard to continue with the same policies when people and 
countries get poorer. The EU has until now maintained most of its economic policies that 
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favour the free market (and the rich) but it is finding it increasingly difficult to do so when the 
population by large starts to show their discontent. The latest demonstration against the 
austerity measures was held in the heart of Europe, Brussels in November 7th (Bland 2014, 
BBC article). This discontent has created a niche for policies for reregulation of finance such 
as the proposed Financial Transaction Tax and Banking union. Also the taxation issues have 
been noticed and The European Commission has come up with an action plan in order to 
reign in the tax havens and tax avoiders. 
Third, many of the tax havens are situated inside the EU’s borders or are somehow strongly 
affiliated with EU member states. Luxembourg provides an example of the former whilst 
Jersey and Guernsey exemplify the latter, being strongly affiliated with the City of London. 
This appears rather hypocritical considering the EU is one of the biggest supporters of 
international tax cooperation. The EU countries are predominantly considered to be ‘high tax 
countries’ but at the same time several member states face an acute sovereign debt crisis. 
Consequently this would lead you to believe that European member states would attempt to 
generate much needed funds through extra fiscal revenue. Addressing tax havens would be 
one way of doing this. One could say that finding a global solution for the tax haven problem 
is the real problem, but could the EU promote this possibility when tax havens are blooming 
inside its own borders, creating unequal competitive settings even between the member 
states. This is very much against the core idea of harmonised, common markets in Europe. 
In order to trace and analyse the EU’s actions concerning tax havens we will utilise the 
concept of policy narratives. Narratives convey how their users see the political situations 
and thus offer the means with which we can find the changes in their perception of the world. 
We are interested in these changes of perception in the EU and what kind of outcomes they 
have already have on the EU and international tax system. Our hypothesis is that the 
problems posed by tax havens were not considered as devastating and urgent before the 
economic crises than what they are now.  
Another key concept for this project is depoliticisation. As stated earlier, tax havens are not a 
new phenomenon but they have not been at the centre of attention of the EU countries until 
recently. In other words the whole issue of tax havens was depoliticised, put out of reach of 
political decisions. However, this situation has changed with the newly sparked interested on 
tax issues on the EU level. What makes the issue even more relevant are the developments 
made on the international level by the OECD. Two months ago (October 2014) more than 50 
countries agreed to implement a new standard on Automatic Exchange of Information for 
Tax Purposes by the end of 2018 at the 7th meeting of the Global Forum in Berlin. This is 
considered by many to represent a significant milestone in the fight against tax havens. 
Whether it has a significant influence on tax havens remains to be seen, however the 
announcement indicates that the international community is no longer ignoring them and the 
repercussions that many people claim that they create.  
Taking these recent developments into consideration we feel that tax havens are an 
important issue to investigate and therefore we have devised the following research question 
and subsequent working questions: 
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I.II. Research Question 
 
Why has the issue of tax havens been repoliticised on the European Union’s economic and 
political agenda? 
 
I.III. Working Questions 
 
1. How has the EU changed the way it addresses the issue of tax evasion and tax 
havens (the way it frames the issues)? 
2. What courses of action do the EU see as realistic and unrealistic?  
3. What are the tangible actions the EU has already taken in order to address the 
issue? 
4. Has the EU identified tax havens inside its own borders? 
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I.IV. Project Design 
Thus far our Introduction has discussed that the issue of tax justice, tax evasion and tax 
havens have been pushed back into both political and public consciousness. We have stated 
that we intend to examine why the the issue of tax havens specifically has been pushed 
back up the agenda of the European Union. We have devised a research question and four 
working questions in order to achieve this. This Project Design intends to provide the reader 
with an overview of what each chapter of the project entails.   
Our first Chapter Methodology discusses the methods that we have employed and the 
approaches that we have taken in order to produce this project. It justifies why we have 
conducted an explorative case study as well as discussing some of the key texts that we 
have used and the dominant limitations that we have encountered whilst producing this 
work.  
Our second chapter Theoretical Framework provides a detailed explanation of what a policy 
narrative is and discusses the work of Emery Roe and Claudio Radaelli. Furthermore we 
discuss the concepts of politicisation, repoliticisation and depoliticisation and the work of Bob 
Jessop.  We demonstrate how we will use policy narrative analysis and the concepts of 
de/re-politicalisation and the work of Roe, Radaelli and Jessop in order to consider why the 
issue of tax havens has been become more eminent on the agenda of the EU.   
Our third chapter, Contextualisation is split into two sections. The first section asks What is a 
Tax Haven? and provides an overview as to what they are, how they have developed and 
why they are controversial. The section section our State of the Art Literature Review 
discusses some key perspectives and empirical studies on that have been conducted on tax 
havens thus far 
Our fourth chapter, The European Union and Taxation gives a brief overview of the 
European Union discussing how it has evolved and how its influence have increased over 
time. It also gives a short introduction on how decision making occurs in the Union. Lastly, it 
provides a briefing on how the taxation issues, including the issues of tax evasion, tax 
avoidance and tax havens have developed in the EU. 
Our fifth chapter Analysis is split into three sections. In the first section we analyse four EU 
documents produced by the Commission in order to describe the policy narrative of its 
stance on tax havens. In the second section we compare this narrative to the one described 
by Jason Sharman which he named the Global Imperative. This policy narrative was used by 
the EU from the turn of the millenium until the time of the writing if his article (2008). We end 
the Analysis by demonstrating how the EU has both depoliticised and repoliticised the issue 
of tax havens, using Jessop’s work as a guideline in doing so.  
In our Conclusion we re-visit the four working questions before answering our research 
question. We will then summarise how we could have improved our project or state what we 
could have done differently in our Afterthought. 
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1. Methodology 
 
This project considers why the issue of tax havens has been repoliticised on the European 
Union’s economic and political agenda. It attempts to answer the research question through 
addressing our specified working questions. These ask if the EU has changed the way it 
addresses the issue of tax havens and what actions it has taken in order to tackle the 
problems posed by them. We have adopted a case study using a qualitative approach. The 
information that we have collated is primarily secondary data obtained from various sources, 
however we have conducted some primary research using four policy documents produced 
by the European Commission obtained from a website that publishes all of its documents.  
 
Using a qualitative approach for our project enables us to acquire an extensive 
understanding of tax havens including how and why they came into existence. It also 
enables us to understand what narratives are and the concepts of politicisation, 
repoliticisation and depoliticisation. Furthermore it enables us to understand how our case 
study (The European Union) came into existence and how it functions, especially in terms of 
taxation within the member states.  
1.1. Case Study 
A case study requires a detailed and intensive analysis of a specific case. “The most 
common use of the term ‘case’ associates the case study with a location, such as a 
community or organization. The emphasis tends to be upon an intensive examination of the 
setting” (Bryman 2008:53). In this project, the study of location is the European Union and 
the intensive analysis describes how changes in the EU’s policy narrative on tax havens can 
be used to explain why the issue has been repoliticised on their political and economic 
agenda.   
1.2. Data Collection 
This project consists of collecting both primary and secondary data from a wide range of 
sources. We obtained our secondary data through a variety of books, e-books, journal 
articles and articles from both websites and blogs. For our primary data, we obtained 
documents from the European Union’s website. Beneath is a brief summary of how we used 
some our main sources.  
 
Two books that were particularly useful for this project were Jason Sharman’s ‘Haven’s in a 
Storm: The Struggle for Global Tax Regulation’ (2006) and Ronen Palan, Richard Murphy 
and Christian Chavagneux’s ‘Tax Havens: How Globalisation Really Works’ (2010). They 
provided comprehensive discussions on what tax havens are, how they evolved, and how 
they are seen in the wider context of tax competition. Therefore these texts were particularly 
relevant for our Contextualisation and its State of the Art Literature Review. Furthermore 
Dhammika Dharmapala’s (2008) ‘What Problems and Opportunities are created by Tax 
Havens?’ and Phillip Genschel and Peter Schwarz’s (2011) ‘Tax Competition: A Literature 
Review’ were also instrumental in the production of this chapter.  
 
We obtained several journal articles that were particularly relevant for our Analysis as they 
discussed policy narratives in the context of taxation in the European Union. Claudio 
Radaelli’s article ‘Harmful Tax Competition in the EU: Policy Narratives and Advocacy 
Coalitions’ (1999) and Jason Sharman’s (2008) ‘Regional Deals and the Global Imperative: 
The External Dimension of the European Union Savings Tax Directive’ were particularly 
constructive.  
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In addition to the Radaelli text, Emery Roe’s ‘Narrative Policy Analysis: Theory and Practice’ 
(1994) also provided us with an overview as to what a policy narrative is. Radaelli cites Roe 
quite heavily and therefore we chose to obtain a copy of his text. These two texts serve as 
the foundations for our Theoretical Framework, as does Bob Jessop’s (2014) ‘Repoliticising 
Depoliticisation’. Whilst we explored several journal articles on politicisation, depoliticisation 
and re-politicisation, we decided to use his text as we found it gave one of the more clearer 
and concise accounts of the three concepts. 
 
For the The European Union and Taxation chapter we utilised many introductory texts to the 
EU. These included Bomberg et al. (2012), Hix (2005), McCormick (2008) and Moussis 
(2010). In addition to these texts we also used the EU websites. These included europa.eu, 
ec.europa.eu, europarl.europa.eu and consilium.europa.eu. The EU Treaties were used as 
the primary source regarding the legal basis for taxation issues in the EU and its member 
states. The EU Treaties are also available online. 
 
Our primary sources came from the European Commission. We wanted to conduct analysis 
of their recent policy narrative ourselves. We analysed four EU documents that discussed 
tax havens and the issues that they facilitate, mainly tax fraud and evasion. The first 
document we discussed was the Commission’s paper ‘concrete ways to reinforce the fight 
against tax fraud and tax evasion including in relation to third parties ’ (EC 2012a). The 
second document we analysed was the Commission’s communication to the Parliament and 
the Council  entitled ‘An Action Plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion’ 
(EC 2012b). The third document we examined was a recommendation ‘regarding measures 
intended to encourage third countries to apply minimum standards of good governance in 
tax matters’ (EC 2012c) and the fourth  a recommendation ‘on aggressive tax planning’ (EC 
2012d) These texts are discussed expansively in our Analysis.  
 
The EU is remarkably transparent in its legislation processes and all the documents 
concerning specific legislative acts can be traced online using a website called Pre-Lex. 
When choosing relevant EU documents for our purposes we took into consideration the 
mode of legislative procedure concerning tax issues. As stated in our chapter called The 
European Union and Taxation, the European Parliament acts only in a consultative role in 
this issue and that is why we decided to give EP documents less attention. Nevertheless, the 
speeches made in the Parliament sessions by the MEPs and commissioners are interesting 
since they are acts of narration in a concrete way: different actors are trying to persuade 
others to follow their opinion through the means of telling a story. These speech acts would 
be an interesting primary resource for a more broader study on the issue, and could even 
provide an opportunity to use quantitative methods in order to track what kind of language 
politicians use in the EU setting. In an ideal case we would have constructed also the older 
narratives from primary resources but taking into consideration the time and resource 
constraints we decided to use earlier narrative analyses made of EU documents as the 
starting point for tracing the change. Articles by Radaelli (1999) and Sharman (2008) were 
especially useful in this regard.  
1.3. Delimitations 
By solely concentrating on the European Union opposed to other key actors who are trying 
to coordinate responses to tax havens we are able to provide a more comprehensive 
analysis within the specified time period and character limit. A comparison to other key 
actors such as the OECD and NGOs such as Tax Justice Network would have been very 
interesting, however the amount of resources and time that would have been required for 
this meant that such a study was not feasible.   
 
Even though the EU is transparent in their legislative processes, the work of the Council still 
remains somewhat secretive. The Council meetings are recorded for the use of general 
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audience but it is the common practice for the Council (that is: the ministers representing 
member states) to do bulk of the ‘political’ work in informal settings (Bomberg et al. 2012:57). 
That is why a real primary insight to the change in the opinions in the Council would have 
required interviewing very high level politicians or their staff members. 
 
Although we are aware that the university supplement students with funds in order to 
conduct fieldwork, we did not apply for these. In retrospect we feel that making contact with 
a journalist or EU political analyst who has a broad knowledge of taxation issues and access 
to employees of the Council may have been beneficial to us. However due to past 
unsuccessful experiences of trying to arrange such trips and therefore decided to invest this 
time into further secondary research.   
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2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1. Intro 
When states are facing a problem they cannot solve alone, they cooperate with other 
countries to form international regimes and institutions. The creation of such an entity 
provides a platform for discussion between jurisdictions, enabling them to address the 
problem together. However, building international institutions is not a simple process and the 
EU is a good example of that. European integration has been ongoing for almost 70 years 
and ‘deeper economic integration’ occurred in the 1990s. Nevertheless, there has still been 
no clear solution proposed for the issue of tax havens. The EU already has well developed 
institutional machinery and this is why we believe that it has the institutional framework to 
provide the first truly international and multilateral answer to the various international 
taxation problems. But since the solution for this problem has not happened earlier in the 
integration processes, we believe that looking into a de-/repoliticisation process within the 
EU provides a better explanations for our questions than a simplistic explanation deriving 
from national self interests.  
 
In order to answer our research question and working questions effectively, we must first 
devise a way in which we can ascertain when, how and why the EU’s taxation policies have 
changed. Only once we have seen how its views on taxation have altered can we start to 
consider the political and economical factors responsible for such adjustments and why the 
issue of tax havens has been reintroduced on to the EU’s agenda. Therefore we must devise 
an empirical method which highlights such changes. By analysing policy narratives used by 
some of the EU institutions we are able to see how its view of tax havens have fluctuated 
over a specified time period. This section discusses what policy narratives are, how they are 
constructed and why they are important. We draw heavily on the work of Roe and  Radaelli’s 
(1999) article on harmful tax competition in the EU. Furthermore this chapter discusses the 
concepts of politicisation, depoliticisation and repoliticisation and the work of Bob Jessop 
(2014). It is essential that we demonstrate a good understanding of these concepts and how 
they intertwine in order to answer our research question.  
2.2. Narrative policy analysis 
Narrative policy analysis, as the name suggests, is a form of policy analysis that 
concentrates on the narratives created by policy makers. These narratives are used to 
persuade and convince the reader or hearer to conform to the reality explained in the 
narratives. According to Roe, all narrative policy analysis has its starting point in “the reality 
of uncertainty and complexity in the polarised issues and controversies of today” (1994:10). 
In other words, when the issue in question is too complex and ambiguous for decision 
makers to create reliable and simple facts a majority would agree to, they explain the issue 
to others (and themselves) in a form of a story. These stories are called policy narratives. 
The use of policy narrative analysis supports our aims well, since taxation, especially in its 
international form, is a complex and ambiguous issue. Furthermore, as noted in our 
Contextualisation chapter, tax havens are so ambiguous that there is still no agreed upon 
definition for the term. 
2.2.1. What is a policy narrative?  
Radaelli (1999:663) argues that narratives represent a form in which knowledge about policy 
is cast. They usually adopt the form of a causal story (Stone 1989 in Ibid) and like all tales, 
consist of a beginning, middle and end. They can also exist in the form of an argument, in 
which case they have premises and conclusions (Roe 1994:155).  The chronological order of 
events is of fundamental importance to the narrative as its plot hinges on its sequentiality 
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opposed to its truthful or fallacious elements.  Roe (1994:36–7) argues that narratives are 
less “hortatory and normative than ideology” and that they “describe scenarios not so much 
by telling what should happen as about what will happen, according to their narrator”. This is 
an important perspective as pointing out to what should be done gives the narrative more 
normative characteristics, whereas by implicitly pointing out what will happen makes the 
narrative easier to understand as a factual statement.  
 
Banerjee (1999:2 in Radaelli 1999:663) argues that “a narrative frames a situation in a way 
that makes one action and not others sensible”. Even when their value of trust has been 
called into deliberation, “these narratives are explicitly more programmatic than myths and 
have the objective of getting their hearers to assume to do something” (Roe 1994:37). The 
strength of policy narratives comes from their ability to give easily comprehensive 
explanation to current issues without having a thorough scientific analyses to stand by the 
explanations. In some cases they remain strong even if they are in opposition to empirical 
facts (Roe 1994:51). 
 
The purpose of a policy narrative is to stabilise the policy process in times of ambiguity and 
insecurity. When conditions of uncertainty prevent the use of scientific methods of knowing, 
policy stories certify and stabilise “the assumptions needed for decision making in the face of 
what is genuinely uncertain and complex (Roe 1994:50–1). Nevertheless, Roe goes on to 
argue that it is also possible to create a policy narrative about the uncertainty itself in order 
to create more political will for making decisions (Ibid. 6).  
 
At times of uncertainty, “policy narratives make problems amenable to human action” and 
they typically suggest one course of action instead of others by linking one course of action 
to the others set in the future (Radaelli 1999:663–4).  Such doubtful and unclear times can 
allow policy narratives to persist and even flourish even though they may be inaccurate. 
Narratives transmit meaning and recommend action. By doing this they ‘objectify a course of 
action and make it as independent from a specific actor’s preferences as a text from a 
speaker’ (Czarniawska 1997:12–13 in Ibid. 664). As Banerjee (1999:2 in Radaelli 1999:664) 
explains, “narratives begin in the past and end in the future. By placing the present in the 
middle, interaction narratives are able to construct situations and generate actions.” 
Banerjee compares policy narratives to that of a dramatic film plot in explaining how tension 
and uncertainty leads to the favourite course of action in the future: 
 
If the present situation is the penultimate episode of a narrative, then it is fraught with the 
dramatic tension that occurs before the end of a story or a movie. The action to be 
committed is implicitly constrained in the narrative construction of a situation in the same 
way that the content of a happy ending of a movie is recognisable near its end. (Banerjee 
1998:196–197 in Radaelli 1999:664). 
2.2.2. Replacing a presentation with another? 
Roe’s policy narrative analysis is based on literary theories and aims to finding a solution to 
a public policy problem when more conventional policy analysis theories are not helpful (Roe 
1994:1). It combines critical approach to the way in which problem is presented but at the 
same time aims to give another presentation, which is supposedly better than the earlier 
ones. In order to avoid this cycle of presentations that might go even further from the reality 
of the problem we have decided to not give our own presentation of the problem. Instead, we 
want to compare the different kind of presentations the EU is making in its official documents 
and trace the changes with the concepts of politicisation and repoliticisation.  
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2.3. Politicisation & Depoliticisation 
Palonen (2005:44 in Jessop 2014:207) defines the idea of politicisation in one sentence: 
“There are no naturally political questions, but only questions that have been politicised”. 
Many of the issues we deem automatically political can be questioned easily. Who decided 
that a relationship between two persons is political? A relationship is a personal and 
emotional phenomenon, and it is hard to think of it to belonging to the same realm as laws 
and regulations and other ‘political’ issues. However, issues such as same sex marriages 
are debated in national parliaments and politicians are making decisions that determine the 
definition of the relationship between people that they do not know. Western citizens live in 
deeply politicised societies and making decisions through political means and institutions 
feels perfectly natural to them. Paradoxically, when they take some issues to be political and 
others to be apolitical, they are actively contributing to depoliticisation.  
 
Depoliticisation means that a formerly politicised issue has been removed from the realm of 
politics. For example this can occur when some specific areas are deemed to be so complex 
that it is better to have specially educated experts making decisions in these areas opposed 
to politicians. Being able to utilise expert help in the act of policy making is not necessarily 
depolitical. Members of parliament at national and EU level often consult  experts of different 
fields when trying to reach solutions of specific problems that they have little knowledge of. 
However, when the power of making a decision is entirely transferred from the electoral body 
to experts, the issue has been successfully depoliticised. 
2.3.1. The interaction of Polity, Politics & Policy 
‘Politics’ is a complex word in itself and that is why Jessop makes a useful distinction of 
three levels within the term: polity, politics and policy (2014:208–9). “‘Polity’ covers the 
institutional architecture of the political field, including its boundaries and boundary-
maintenance vis-à-vis non-political spheres, and the asymmetric effects of this architecture 
on political practice.” (Jessop 2014:208). In other words, polity means the ways in which the 
political institutions have been built and what kind of issue areas they concern. How powerful 
these institutions are and how they can force other parts of society (non-political spheres) to 
conform to their will are questions at the level of polity. It is also important to pay attention to 
the constraints that these institutions have over policymakers: even if a politician wanted to 
profoundly change the society they live in, they have to work within the institutions of that 
society’s polity. The decisions made by the politicians before her on the structuring of the 
political institutions restrict the ways in which she can act as a policymaker.  
 
“Politics refers to formally instituted, organised or informal practices that are directly oriented 
to, or otherwise shape, the exercise of state power” (Jessop 2014: 209). Whereas polity is a 
stable and structural concept, politics refers to the agency of actors and their activities in 
order to make changes to the polity in which they operate. On a national level this means 
transforming the scope of the political sphere, changing the balances of forces inside the 
state or exercising direct control over the state (military) powers. In this sense politics does 
not concern the day-to-day policy making of a polity, but is more about its deeper 
transformation.  
 
“Policy concerns the overall strategic line of the state ... the aims and content of the 
particular decisions and non-decisions” (Jessop 2014:209). Policies are the day to day 
vehicles of the aims of politics in a polity. Even though it is relatively easy to make clear 
borders between the three Ps as Jessop calls them, he reminds that all of them have some 
kind of institutional and practical features. It is important to note that even though Jessop 
refers to the ‘state’ when he explains the workings of the three Ps, his concept can also be 
applied to a regional or international level such as the EU. (Jessop 2014:208–9). 
 12 
 
2.3.2. Depoliticisation in Polity 
How does the depoliticisation work at the level of polity? In essence, polity means structuring 
a line between policy makers (state) and the rest of the society. Mitchell states that “The 
essence of modern politics is not policies formed on one side of this division being applied to 
or shaped by the other, but the producing and reproducing of this line of difference” (Mitchell 
1991:95, referred in Jessop 2014:209). In practice this means deciding whether an issue 
belongs to the political sphere or not. Taking this decision can be either a conscious or 
unconscious act by the policy makers. Another aspect of of de-/politicisation at the polity 
level is the shifting of a policy issue to another branch in the governance structure. At state 
level, this could mean shifting e.g. the unemployment policy from the ministry of labour to the 
ministry of finance. In the peculiar case of the EU, it is possible to shift the governance 
responsible for a specific issue from the member states to the EU.  
2.3.3. Depoliticisation in Politics 
Jessop gives five examples of depoliticisation processes in the level of politics. The first form 
of depoliticisation differentiates between situations in the field of politics: normal and 
exceptional. In the normal situation political forces are engaged in self-limitation by 
thematising only some aspects of the society as political. When this situations changes to an 
exceptional one (times of economic/political crisis) the state can curtail its democratic 
activities and declare a state of emergency suspending and limiting the forms of political 
resistance. Whereas in the case of political crisis it is possible that coup d’etats or one-party 
rule take place, during an economic crisis a state can shift from electorally chosen 
government to a technocratic government as was the case in Italy and Spain during the 
Eurozone crisis. At the time of crisis, it is easier for a state to make big reforms out of 
necessity as a means to end the occurring crisis situation. When done by an exceptional 
form of government (such as technocratic), these decision are effectively depoliticised. 
(Jessop 2014:214). 
 
In the second example the democratic self-limitation is formalised through re-writing the 
constitutional law. This constitutionalisation limits powers of politics and shifts issues out of 
the reach of political decision making. When this is done, it is hard to reverse the situation 
back to where it was, since amending constitution is usually politically very hard to achieve. 
The third example is using “non-political figures” when trying to reach a decision in a 
debated issue. This could mean commissions consisted of e.g. retired politicians, 
technocrats and quasi-non-governmental organisations. Using these commissions is a way 
to go “above politics” and the bickering of politicians concerned of electrocal cycles. The 
fourth example is the act of governmentalisation, in other words “creating the conditions for 
technocratic decision making” (Jessop 2014:215). This is achieved through the inclusion of 
scientific expertise in decision making. We can use the example of rating different 
governments through various economic benchmarks, which can result in changes in credit 
rating of countries. Reducing the success/failure of a government and its country to this kind 
of numerical measure, it is easy to support certain kind of policies with ‘scientific’ backing of 
numbers. The fifth and final example made by Jessop is “sedimentation”. This is a more 
semantic way of depoliticisation and is linked with the depoliticisation process of policies. It 
covers the routinisation of politics that leads to taking the contentious issues as granted 
(Jessop 2014:216). We shall discuss it in more detail under the heading “Depoliticisation in 
Policies”. 
2.3.4. Depoliticisation in Policies 
Depoliticisation on the level of policies is a resulting factor of depoliticisation in the two above 
levels of polity and politics. Policy level is seen as the pinnacle of policy making, the act of 
decision and non-decision making. If an issue is effectively depoliticised, it should never 
reach the policy level. However, while making policies the actors are able to demean the 
 13 
 
importance of the policy in question and call for its removal from their fora of political 
decision making. This is done by what Jessop calls sedimentation, and which we link with 
Roe’s policy narratives. With certain kind of construction of policy narratives, actors are able 
to achieve the goal of depoliticisation on the policy level and thematise issues as non-
political, non-negotiable or simply non-possible. (Jessop 2014:216). 
2.3.5. Implementing These Concepts 
By using the work of Roe and Radaelli in addition to Jessop, we intend to present and 
analyse the policy narratives of key EU documents concerning tax havens. We will trace 
possible changes within these narratives subsequently identifying instances of de-/ 
repoliticisation apparent within them.  
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3. Contextualisation 
3.1. What is a Tax Haven?  
Although there is a general consensus to what they constitute, like with many other notions, 
a universal definition of the term has not been formulated. As Sharman (2006:21) notes, the 
application of the term is often controversial and contested and it has become increasingly 
‘pejorative’. As Palan et al (2009:17) note, the term has been used since the 1950s and 
various definitions have been created by actors from a wide range of backgrounds, however, 
a uniformed definition has never been agreed on.  
Palan et al highlight how in the first ever in depth report into tax havens, the  US Treasury’s 
Gordon Report, concluded “there is no single, clear, objective test which permits the 
identification of a country as a tax haven” (1981:21 in Ibid.). Furthermore Sharman (2006:21) 
notes how the term’s application is often controversial and contested. Aijaz (2013:125) 
simply defines a tax haven as “as a place that tries to attract non-resident funds by offering 
light regulation, low (or zero) taxation and secrecy”. The OECD’s ‘harmful tax competition’ 
project defined tax havens as jurisdictions that have: 
a. No or only nominal taxes (generally or in special circumstances) and offers itself, or 
is perceived to offer itself as a place to be used by non residents to escape tax in their 
country of residence;  
b. Laws or administrative practices which prevent the effective exchange of relevant 
information with other governments on taxpayers benefitting from the low or no tax 
jurisdictions; 
c. lack of transparency 
(OECD 1998: 22-23)  
Our project is primarily concerned with investigating why the issue of tax havens has been 
reintroduced to the EU’s agenda. We do not intend to analyse the technical determinants of 
tax havens and therefore an expansive discussion of definitional problems is not required. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this project we have decided to adopt the OECD’s definition as 
it is a well recognised one and has been adopted by the EU itself (see EC 2012a:11). As 
highlighted by Sharman because of the lack of a uniform definition, no two lists of tax havens 
would ever be identical and the number of entries range from anywhere from “around twenty 
to one hundred jurisdictions” (2006:21). The OECD compiled a list of tax havens two years 
after formulating its definition (Appendix 3). This list is now defunct, however many 
academics still cite it even in recent works and therefore we include it in our project to 
highlight the original group of jurisdictions that were labeled ‘tax havens’.     
3.2.  Key and Controversial Characteristics  
Tax havens are sovereign states or suzerain jurisdictions which possess the right to create 
their own domestic laws (Palan et al. 2010:3). Laws and legislation relating to certain issues 
may differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Prostitution, gambling and the consumption of 
alcohol and drugs are all controversial issues that are legal in some jurisdictions whilst 
prohibited in others. The sovereign state possess the power to decide what it wants to 
legalise or criminalise. In a similar way it exercises the right to create tax codes and financial 
laws in ways that others may consider harmful. Legality has very little to do with either 
opinion or ethics and these jurisdictions are exercising their sovereign rights. International 
law enables them to do this. 
One of the predominant characteristics of a tax havens is its national banking secrecy rules. 
These effectively enable investors to avoid paying the respective capital income taxes in 
 15 
 
their country of residence. Such rules protect investors from the relevant tax authorities as 
they prevent the effective exchange of information on taxpayers benefitting from the low tax 
jurisdictions (Elsayyad & Konrad 2012:295). However as explained later on in this project, 
significant progress  has been made in the area of information exchange in the past two 
months (October and November 2014).   
Tax havens possess quite a distinct set of financial, demographic and geographical 
characteristics that distinguish them from other ‘non-haven’ jurisdictions. Empirical research 
conducted by Dharmapala and Hines (2009) shows that tax havens are on average 
substantially more affluent than non havens, smaller in population size and more intrinsically 
linked towards economic openness. Furthermore they tend to be located in close proximity 
to major capital exporters, and have a larger fraction of their population located within 100 
km of the coast (Dharmapala and Hines 2009). Additionally they also tend to have 
substantially less natural resources than their higher tax counterparts (Ibid.:3).     
Palan (2009b) argues that there are two dominant  geo-political poles around which most of 
the world’s significant tax havens have developed. The first one is the City of London and 
the second encompasses the Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) 
and Ireland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein. The former sees tax havens located in the 
British Crown dependencies (Channel Islands, Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man) and in 
the British Overseas Territories (Cayman Islands, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Turks and 
Caicos and Gibraltar). Palan (2009b) further notes that the only two other significant tax 
havens which are not part of these two poles are Panama and Uruguay.            
Sharman (2010:3) argues that although individually they may appear small and insignificant, 
when considering their combined effect, tax havens possess an important role in the world 
economy. Aijaz (2013:126) argues that global tax revenues lost to tax havens are said to 
exceed $255 billion a year. Such figures lead many such as Sharman (2010:3) to argue that 
they undermine the regulatory and taxation processes of the mainstream and tip the balance 
of the distribution of costs and benefits of globalisation in favour of the global elite to the 
detriment of the vast majority of the global population. In that sense, tax havens are at the 
very heart of globalisation, or at the least the heart of the specific type of globalisation that 
we have witnessed since the 1980s (Sharman 2010:3).  
3.3.  A Brief History of Tax Havens 
The origins of avoidance, concealment and tax evasion can be mapped back to the times of 
the ancient Greeks and Romans when citizens were proficient at concealing their financial 
assets from the authorities (Doggart 2002 in Palan et al 2010:107). Tax havens, on the 
contrary are a more recent development and it is widely agreed that there are three key eras 
in their development. The first period, from approximately the late 19th century to the early 
1920s saw the the most familiar instruments of tax havens come to prominence. The second 
period comprises of the years stretching from the end of World War I through to the 1970s 
when a small number of states began to develop tax havens as an international 
development strategy. The third period and final period are considered as the ‘golden years’ 
of the tax haven running from the early 1970s to the late 1990s. During this period the 
number of tax havens rose dramatically, as did the scope, planning and sheer volume of 
financial assets that passed through them. (Palan et al 2010:107–108).    
Although tax havens have been developed sequentially in different locations over the course 
of the last century, both Palan (2009b) and Sharman (2006:21) note ironically they were not 
originally intended for exclusive strategical taxation purposes. Indeed the first tax haven is 
said to have been accidently established in Monaco by Prince Charles III authorising the 
establishment of the jurisdiction’s casino, subsequently generating enough income to allow 
him to abolish all forms of income tax, it was in America where the art of attrac ting foreign 
investors began. In the 19th Century the state of New Jersey generated much needed funds 
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by imposing a franchise tax on all corporations headquartered in New Jersey. Anglo-Saxon 
countries had highly restrictive laws of incorporations at that time and corporate 
headquarters were attracted to New Jersey primarily due to its liberal incorporation laws, and 
to some extent by its relatively low rate of corporate taxation (Palan 2009b).  
Whilst the US invented the practice of offering amenable regulatory environments to attract 
investment from non nonresident companies, it was the Europeans who were responsible for 
initially deliberately shaping comprehensive taxation strategies in the post WWI period. The 
Swiss canton of Zug was the first polity to implement deliberate low levels of tax as it was in 
desperate need of finance following the large forced rebates it gave to to two of the largest 
industrial enterprises who were threatening to leave the Canton (Palan et al 2010: 111). The 
Zugoise authorities lowered their tax levels in order to compete with their much more affluent 
neighbour Zurich. Although impoverished and with only a population of 100,000, Palan 
(2010: 112) notes how Zug was successfully transformed into an international trading area 
which is now home to 18,000 companies including major multi national corporations such as 
Shell. After Zug many jurisdictions duplicated their method in the hope of similar results. As 
these new forms of jurisdictions managed to attract more and more investment they also 
started to attract the attention of the public authorities. The first government initiative to 
combat them was launched in the USA during Kennedy’s presidency, whilst the Bretton 
Woods system was still influential (Rosenzweig 2010:97–5).  
3.4. The State of the Art: A literature review  
Due to the vast amounts of fiscal revenue that taxation generates for governments, there is a 
wealth of literature on the topic that spans across a wide range of sub- issues. As Keen and 
Konrad (2012:61) note, recent literature produced on tax havens has begun to focus on 
whether their existence and activities have beneficial effects. This question is closely related 
to the wider one of whether tax competition can be welfare-improving. One obvious impact of 
jurisdictions offering low or zero rates of taxation has been an exacerbation in tax 
competition amongst states (Palan et al 2010:153). The past two decades have been 
responsible for the intensification of research into international tax competition and the 
literature produced on tax evasion and tax havens can be seen to fall under this category. 
Whilst we do not have the scope to discuss tax competition models in depth (see Zodrow 
and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986), this section gives a brief overview of the notion 
of tax competition before discussing some of the more significant perspectives and studies 
on tax havens. 
3.4.1. International Tax Competition 
Genschel and Schwarz (2011: 340) argue that tax competition is an old concept but political 
and academic interest in the issue has only recently arisen. The onset of deep economic 
integration in the 1980s saw the erosion of mobility barriers. Trade liberalization, capital 
decontrol and currency convertibility at the global level, regional integration schemes such 
as the EU’s Single Market and NAFTA, as well as new communications and transport 
technologies greatly reduced the transaction costs of moving goods, services, capital and 
jobs across national borders (Ibid).  Prior to this period of great economic transition, taxes 
were too low and cross-national tax differentials were too small to trigger significant cross-
border movements of taxpayers and bases. In the earlier decades of the twentieth century, 
tax burdens increased dramatically but so did restrictions of cross-border mobility: high 
tariffs, strict capital controls, limited currency convertibility and tough visa and immigration 
laws (Ibid). These restrictions greatly reduced the scope for international tax avoidance and 
evasion. As documented in our Contextualisation tax havens did exist during this period prior 
to the onset of deep economic integration, however such restrictions prevented them from 
receiving vast amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI). Subsequently the political and 
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academic interest in the issues of tax havens, evasion, avoidance, competition and co-
ordination was not as rife as it currently is today.   
 
As a result of increased mobile international capital from the 1970s onwards, a growing 
number of states developed strategies in order to attract businesses to their domain. 
Targeting industrial policies, the provision of cheap research and development funds and 
infrastructural support were examples of such strategies that states began to employ (Palan 
1998 in Palan et al 2010: 153). As a result, governments found themselves under growing 
pressure to lower taxes on capital and businesses. 
 
Since the early 1990s, the statutory tax rate for corporate taxation declined almost 
everywhere in the world and in the EU the average rate declined by an average of ten points 
from 35% to 25% between 1995 and 2007 (Ibid:154). Susan Strange (1998:564) argued that 
‘states are now engaged increasingly in a different competitive game: they are competing for 
world market shares as the surest means to greater wealth and greater economic security’ 
(Susan Strange (1998:564 in Ibid). Palan et al (2010:154) also note that studies conducted 
by Bestley and Case (1995) and LeRoy (2006) evidence that tax competition also occurs 
internally within states not just between them. Furthermore empirical research also suggests 
pervasive tax competition among countries and municipalities in Europe and the United 
States (Brueckner and Saavedra 2001; Heynedels and Vuchelen 1998 in Palan et al 2010: 
154).       
3.4.2. Destructive Tax Havens  
Those critical of international tax competition tend to view tax havens as harmful and 
parasitic for the world economy. As Dharmapala (2008:2) notes, the popular image of tax 
havens is one that emphasises their role in facilitating tax evasion by individuals. Slemrod 
and Wilson (2006) portray tax havens as ‘parasitic on the revenues of other countries’ and 
are undesirable for several reasons. They argue that they lead to the wasteful expenditure of 
resources, both by firms in their participation in havens and by governments in their attempts 
to enforce their tax codes (Slemrod and Wilson 2006:5). In their framework, firms based in 
non-haven countries can choose to purchase “concealment services” from havens, thereby 
avoiding (or evading) home country taxes. In addition to the resource costs incurred by 
havens in providing concealment services, tax avoidance also induces non-havens to 
expend additional resources on enforcement (Dharmapala 2008:12). In the equilibrium of 
this model, small countries decide to become tax havens. The existence of havens 
intensifies tax competition and forces non-haven countries to set lower tax rates than they 
otherwise would, thereby reducing the supply of public goods. These welfare losses can be 
ameliorated in their model by the elimination of tax havens (Ibid). 
 
The OECD view tax havens in a similar way to that of Slemrod and Wilson. Its ‘harmful tax 
competition’ (HTC) project launched in 1996 was the primary response to the erosion of tax 
bases of higher tax countries. The project highlighted two broad categories of unacceptable 
behaviour: ‘harmful tax regimes’ and ‘tax havens’ (Kudrle 2010: 75 in Martens and Jakobi 
2010). The initiative intended to discourage the use of preferential tax regimes for foreign 
investors and to encourage effective information exchange among the tax authorities of 
different countries. As part of the initiative, the OECD produced a list of countries and 
territories that it deemed to be tax havens (Appendix 1) . In the years since, most of these 
havens have agreed to improve the transparency of their tax systems and to facilitate 
information exchange. However, the extent of information-sharing in practice is unclear and 
so is the impact of the HTC project as a whole. 
 
Dharmapala (2008:11) notes how Kudrle (2008) examined the total foreign portfolio 
investment (as reported by the Bank for International Settlements) in the Cayman Islands 
and in a broader set of tax haven countries. His time-series analysis found no significant 
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impact of the OECD initiative. Furthermore, Dharmapala (Ibid) notes how evidence from 
other studies (although limited) suggests that the initiative has not had any significant impact 
on tax haven activity. However, when taking into consideration the differences between 
(legal) corporate tax planning and (illegal) individual evasion, information-sharing only 
threatens the latter. Thus, the OECD initiative cannot be expected to have much impact on 
corporate uses of tax havens, even if (or when) the initiative is fully implemented. (Ibid).  
 
Studies investigating the relationship between information exchange and capital flight show 
that investors have not relocated their capital after the call for more transparency in tax 
havens, as was widely anticipated. Huizinga and Nicodeme (2004) concluded that capital 
flows between countries is not depressed by bilateral information exchange between fiscal 
authorities (Rixen and Schwarz 2012:154). Furthermore Rixen and Schwarz’s (2012) study 
on the EU Savings Tax Directive concludes that the same phenomenon is evident on a 
multilateral scale within Europe.   
 
There is also a large body of literature that highlights the negative impact that tax havens 
have on developing nations. There is a prolonged debate as to whether or not tax havens 
lower global welfare. Leaman and Waris (2013:4) argue that tax arrangements of states and 
the corporations of OECD states have critical effects on the development potential of the 
less powerful states in Africa, Asia, Latin America and even in Europe’s own periphery. In 
direct relation to tax havens they argue that ‘low-tax jurisdictions continue to represent a 
major obstacle to a recalibration of global economic affairs which would allow the 
sustainable modernisation and development of poorer states, combined with social just ice’ 
(Ibid). 
 
Aijaz (2013:126) notes how the ‘Enough for Everyone If’ campaign headed by former UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan concluded that tax havens cost Africa $38 billion a year in lost 
revenue as multinational corporations transfer their profits out of the continent. 
Approximately $1 trillion of capital has been exported from Africa in the last 30 years 
whereas inward investment in terms of FDI or aid is approximately $300 million (African 
Progress Report 2013 in Ibid). According to Aijaz these statistics demonstrate the large 
scale detrimental effects that tax havens have on the global south (Ibid.). 
3.4.3. Productive Tax Havens 
There is a growing body of literature that views tax havens in a more constructive light, 
arguing that under certain conditions they actually enhance efficiency and mitigate 
competition. This contrasts to the view that they are detrimental to the tax bases of high tax 
countries and hinder the progress of underdeveloped nations.  
 
Palan et al (2010: 155) note how mainstream economists are generally supportive of tax 
havens arguing that international tax competition limits the natural expansionist tendencies 
of bureaucratic governments. Rose and Spiegel (2005) argue that tax havens are symbiotic 
opposed to parasitic (in response to Slemrod and Wilson 2006) (Palan et al (2010:155). 
Additionally Hong and Smart’s work ‘In praise of tax havens’ argues that because companies 
shift fiscal activities to tax havens such as financing, insurance and intangibles, they are less 
likely to shift ‘real’ investment offshore (Palan et al 2010:155).  
 
Whilst empirical research has repeatedly provided evidence to show that tax havens host a 
disproportionate fraction of the world’s foreign direct investment (FDI), corporate tax revenue 
in the US and UK has actually increased, suggesting that the concerns over the detrimental 
effects may be exaggerated (Dharmapala (2008:2).  Palan et al (2010:155) note how Desai, 
Foley and Hines (2004a, 2005) argue the use of conduits such as holding company or 
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subsidiaries in tax havens result in higher growth rates for company activities in non-tax 
havens. 
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4.  The European Union and Taxation 
 
The European Union is a unique political entity comprising of  28 member states and over 
500 million citizens. Its history began in the early 1950s with creation of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) comprising of six European countries. It was transformed to 
the European Economic Community (EEC) with the signing of the treaty of Rome in 1957. 
The treaty of Maastricht signed in 1993 saw the collection of members states re-named the 
European Union. 
 
This European integration process has transformed itself in many different ways and 
changing the name few times has not been the biggest change. What started as a group of 
six countries concerned about the manufacturing levels of steel is now a union of 28 member 
states (December 2014). This political entity challenges the ways in which political scientists 
and practitioners of international relations see the world and the possibilities of transnational 
cooperation. It is impossible to delve into the history and workings of the EU more in depth 
within the scope of this project, but Bomberg et al. (2012), Hix (2005), McCormick (2008) 
and Moussis (2010) provide comprehensive introductions to the topic of the EU and the 
European integration in general. It is, however, important to have a short description of the 
main actors and institutions in the EU and how the policy making process works.  
4.1.  The EU Institutions 
The four most important institutions in the EU are the European Council, the European 
Commission (EC), the Council of the European Union (the Council) and the European 
Parliament (EP).  
 
Bomberg et al. (2012:60) call the European Council the “major agenda setter of the Union”. It 
is a council of the heads of member states and it meets at least every 6 months. Even 
though it sets the political direction for the EU, it does not have legislative power. The 
remaining three institutions (the Commission, the Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union) hold this responsibility. 
 
The European Commission (EC) is the most powerful European institution and it represents 
the interests of the Union as a whole. Each member state nominates one Commissioner to 
serve the five year term, which is linked with the European Parliament (EP) elections, held 
every five years (last time in May 2014). The newly elected European Parliament elects in 
turn the Commission President. The Commission President is in charge of distributing policy 
responsibilities to the Commissoners, but the EP has to give their approval for the new 
Commissioners before the Commission can start its work. Besides representing the EU 
interests, the Commission drafts proposals for new European laws and ensures the correct 
application of EU legislation once it is passed. It manages the day-to-day implementation of 
EU policies and the spending of EU funds. It speaks on behalf of all EU countries and 
negotiates international treaties and agreements. Furthermore, it also acts as the guardian of 
the Treaties which form the legal basis for the EU. (Bomberg et al. 2012:48–53; europa.eu: 
European Commission). 
 
The European Parliament represents the EU citizens and is directly elected by them. It 
debates and passes the EU laws and adopts the EU budget in cooperation with the Council. 
It also scrutinises other EU institutions, especially the EC. It is elected every five years and it 
consists of 751 Members of the European Parliament (MEP). The EP powers have 
increased gradually since 1979 (when the first EP was elected) through revision of Treaties. 
Now it co-decides nearly all EU legislation with the Council: both institutions have to agree 
on a text in identical terms before it becomes a law. Even though the budget issues are 
responsibilites of the EP, it only covers spending while taxation is still a competency of 
member states. (Bomberg et al. 2012:61–4; europa.eu: European Parliament). 
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The Council of the European Union (the Council) represents the governments of the member 
states. Its tasks are passing the EU law and approving the EU budget in cooperation with the 
EP, coordinating the broad economic policies of the member states, signing agreements 
between the EU and other countries, developing the EU’s foreign and defence policies and 
coordinating cooperation between courts and police forces of member states. Even though it 
is called the Council in singular, it actually meets in 10 different configurations. Each 
member state is represented by its minister of the policy area in question. The configuration 
in the area of taxation is Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin). Meetings of 
different configurations are the places where the member states try to come to an agreement 
about EU legislation. Even though most areas of EU decision-making are now subject to 
Qualified Majority Voting, voting rarely takes place in the Council meetings. The member 
states seek for consensus, but know that unreasonable opposition can be countered with a 
vote. However, in some policy areas the practice of unanimous voting is still in place. One of 
these “sensitive matters” is tax harmonisation, which means that a single member state can 
block any decisions concerning tax issues. (Bomberg et al. 2012:54–9; europa.eu: Council of 
the European Union).  
4.2.  Decision-making in the EU 
There are three different kind of legislative acts within the EU: regulations, directives and 
decisions. Regulations could be characterised as EU laws: they are binding and directly 
applicable in all member states. Directives are “binding in the terms of goals”, but the 
member states are free to select the means with which to achieve those goals, as long as 
they tell about their plans to the Commission. Decisions are only binding for the specific 
individuals of companies to whom they are addressed. On top of these acts, the EU can also 
give policy recommendations and opinions to the member states. These are not legally 
binding but are used to persuade the member states to change their legislation or give an 
interpretation about the application of e.g. directives. (Bomberg et al. 2012:124; McCormick 
2008:73; TFEU 2012:§288). 
 
The legislative procedure always begins with a proposal from the Commission which is the 
only institution that can initiate the procedures. The proposal does not come simply out of a 
vacuum. Even though the Commission is the official initiator, in the vast majority of the cases 
the original initiative for a proposal comes from somewhere else than the Commission 
(Bomberg et al. 2012:54). After the proposal has been drafted by the Commission, it will be 
sent to the Council and the EP. There are several different kind of procedures according to 
which a proposal will be passed as a regulation, directive or a decision. According to the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union the ordinary legislative procedure consists 
of joint adoption of both the EP and the Council of the proposal made by the Commission. 
The ordinary legislative procedures is sometimes called codecision procedure (the name 
was officially changed to the former in Lisbon Treaty 2009). In other words, in most of the 
cases both the Council and the EP have to adopt the proposal in order to get it passed. 
However, there are exemptions to this rule. Special legislative procedures require the 
adoption by either the EP or the Council, but not both. This means that in some cases the 
EP acts only by giving advisory opinion but the final decision is made by the Council. This is 
called the consultation procedure. This is the procedure used in the field of taxation. Other 
procedures are the consent procedure, the budget procedure, enhanced cooperation and 
delegated powers (Bomberg et al. 2012:128[Box 6.3]). (Bomberg et al. 2012:127–30; TFEU 
2012:§289; europarl.europa.eu: Legislative Powers).  
 
To sum up this mosaic of institutions and legislative procedures, we can have a simplified 
formula of policy making in the EU: 
 
1. (The European Council sets the broader objectives for EU policies)  
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2. The Commission is the only institution that can initiate the legislative process 
3. The proposal made by the Commission has to be adopted by the Council of the 
European Union and/or the European Parliament depending on the policy area 
4. Passed regulations, directives or decisions have a deadline before which the 
member states have to apply them to their national legislation  
4.3.  Developments Regarding Taxation 
There are no regulations (EU laws) on the field of taxation. The responsibility of collecting  
tax off citizens sits with each member state. As stated earlier, tax harmonisation is deemed 
as a sensitive issue and therefore any decisions concerning this issue require unanimous 
support from the member states in the Council. This is why it is difficult to change or create 
new tax rules for the whole EU. We have also learned that the consultation procedure is 
used in the field of taxation, which decreases powers of the EP in this matter. Having solely 
national taxes is one of the key differences between EU member states and for example 
states in the USA, where on top of state taxes, federal taxes also exist. Even though the EU 
is unable to create new taxes or change the current tax levels in member states directly, it 
can create binding directives that the member states have to follow. However, the creation of 
new directives in the field of taxation requires the backing of all the 28 member states. The 
Commission can also give recommendations to the member states regarding tax matters, 
and even though they are not binding they can have a lot of persuasive and symbolic power. 
Due to the deadlocks in the tax issues between the member states, the Commission has 
resorted to use more “non-binding approaches … as a way of making progress in the tax 
field” (ec.europa.eu: EU Tax Policy Strategy).  
 
According to the EU’s tax strategy: “It is clear that there is no need for an across-the-board 
harmonisation of Member States’ tax systems. Provided that they respect Community rules, 
Member States are free to choose the tax systems that they consider most appropriate and 
according to their preferences.” (EC 2001). However, right from its formation, the EU (then 
the European Economic Community) made cooperation in the field of indirect taxation one of 
their prerogatives. Having differentiating indirect tax levels such as the value added tax 
threatened the workings of a single market and it was recognised in the treaty of Rome 
(Moussis 2010:221–4; EEC 1957:§95, §98, §99). The tax issues covered in this paper (tax 
evasion and avoidance through tax havens) fall under the bracket of direct taxation, which 
includes taxation of incomes and capital gains (savings tax). The issue of savings tax is 
particularly relevant to this project as capital gains are often not taxed or under taxed. 
Different types of tax planning schemes, both illegal or illicit (often through the use of tax 
havens) route capital through different tax and secrecy jurisdictions. The treaty of Rome did 
not address harmonising direct taxation levels in the member states but the issue of 
minimum level of harmonisation of direct taxes became apparent in the later years; the 
Commission tabled the first proposal to achieve these minimum levels but it was only 
approved by the Council in 1990 (Moussis 2010:229). 
 
The EU’s special characteristics regarding the free movement of capital creates possibilities 
for its citizens to avoid taxes in their resident countries by legal means. This problem was 
first addressed in 1977 with the institution of mutual assistance by the competent authorities 
by member states (EEC 1977). This could be seen as the first line of directives furthering the 
information sharing in tax issues between member states. The following directives are 
introduced in the later part of this section. Tax evasion through capital movements was not a 
major issue in the first decades of the EEC, since it was regulated more than nowadays. 
Until the dissolving of the Bretton Woods, European states had capital controls in place and 
they were commonplace until the end of 1980s (Schwartz 2010:199; Helleiner 2011b:223–
4;238–9). The liberalisation of capital movements in the beginning of the 1990s changed this 
situation and increased the risk of tax evasion (Moussis 2010:231). The Council approved a 
directive on June 24th 1988, which ensured the full liberalisation of capital movements 
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between the member states. Monetary and quasi-monetary operations became especially 
liberalised. The directive became effective on July 1st 1990 (Moussis 2010:98; EEC 1988). 
The treaty of Maastricht that replaced the treaty of Rome in 1993 marked even greater 
liberalisation of capital movement. Article 56 states that all restrictions on the movement of 
capital between the member states and the member states and the third countries are 
prohibited (EEC 1992). This article remains unchanged in the current consolidated treaty on 
the functioning of the  European Union under a different number (TFEU 2012:§63). This is a 
momentous shift in the monetary policy of the union, freeing the movement of capital to and 
from any non-EU country to any EU country. Moreover, the movement of capital is not only 
freed, but its restriction is prohibited by the most important treaty governing the EU. The 
financial market has been completely liberalised in the EU since January 1st 1993 when the 
treaty of Maastricht came to effect (Moussis 2010:99). 
4.4.  The European Union and tax evasion and tax fraud 
This liberalisation of the movement of capital posed a heightened threat to abuse of the 
differentiating tax systems within the EU. Citizens of the EU were free to move their capital 
across the borders without any restrictions. Whilst the member states did not have any kind 
of information sharing tool in place, it was relatively easy for a citizen of a high-tax country 
like Germany to shift her capital to a low-tax country like Luxembourg and enjoy low levels of 
taxation or no taxation at all on her interest income in there. After receiving the income in 
Luxembourg the individual would simply have to transfer the money back to their German 
bank account. It took more than ten years for the EU to start closing the gaps created by the 
liberalisation in the tax system. In 1997 ECOFIN adopted a Code of Conduct for business 
taxation and concluded that the Commission should come up with a directive proposal for 
taxation of savings (ECOFIN 1998). The Savings Tax Directive was agreed on in 2003 and 
came into effect in 2005 after years of preparation (ECOFIN 2003). Even though the EU’s 
tax strategy stated already in 2001 (EC 2001) that the EU has to combat harmful tax 
competition (having parallels to OECD’s campaign against harmful tax competition), it can 
be argued that the actions became more determined only after the financial crisis hit the EU 
in the latter part of the 2000s. When the EU used huge sums of public money in order to 
maintain the crisis, naturally questions and concerns of fairness within the tax system arose 
amongst the greater public. Whilst some member states were facing outright bankruptcy, 
increased tax revenues were desperately needed in every member state to increase 
investment subsequently kick starting economic activity once more. This meant more activity 
in the EU institutions in the years to come.  
 
The quests for enhanced fairness and bigger tax revenues were intertwined in the 
Commission proposal for amending the three-year-old STD (EC 2008). The Commission 
tried to fill in the loopholes left by the original directive, which allowed ways for affluent 
individuals to circumvent the directive through holding companies and conduits. This was the 
catalyst for a more active European response to the issue of tax evasion and avoidance. 
Following the proposal for amending the STD, the Commission came up with a new proposal 
for greater administrative cooperation in the field of taxation (EC 2009). Slowly but steadily 
both proposals passed the long road of the EU legislation system. The Council passed the 
directive for greater administrative cooperation in 2011 (ECOFIN 2011) and it has already 
been revised to become more comprehensive agreement on exchanging tax information 
automatically instead of by request (ECOFIN 2014b). The revised STD was adopted by the 
Council in March 2014 (ECOFIN 2014a) and the revised directive on administrative 
cooperation in December 2014 (ECOFIN 2014b). Whilst taking the more coercive legislative 
steps of implementing new directives, the Commission was also busy writing 
recommendations and action plans for the Council, the European Parliament and the 
member states. Communication on concrete ways to reinforce the fight against tax fraud and 
evasion was published in the summer of 2012 and recommendations concerning aggressive 
tax planning and minimum standards of good governance in tax matters were published the 
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same day as the action plan in order to strengthen the fight against tax fraud, avoidance and 
evasion later in the year (EC 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d). Furthermore, the Commissioner 
for taxation, customs, statistics, audit and anti-fraud in 2010-2014, Algirdas Šemeta, 
relaunched the Tax Policy Group in 2010. The Group was originally established in the 1990s 
and its aim then and now is to provide “a regular fixed forum for high-level discussions to 
explore the scope and priorities for tax policy coordination within Europe” (EC 2010).  
 
Some of the abovementioned policy papers are analysed in detail in the later part of the 
paper. For now, we want to point out the increased activity in the tax cooperation during the 
past five years. After a rather long time of passivity, the EU has taken big steps to reform the 
internal tax systems and more importantly cooperation between the member states.  
4.5.  EU and responses to tax havens 
The EU has not undertaken a clear offensive stance against tax havens, instead it has called 
the activities of tax evasion and tax fraud into question. We will analyse this rareness of the 
term ‘tax haven’ in the official EU documents in our Analysis chapter. Whilst the EU 
occasionally uses the term tax haven, it never refers to one of its member states by using 
the term. However, it monitors harmful tax practices used in its member states through the 
Code of Conduct Group (ec.europa.eu:Harmful Tax Competition). The Group was 
established in 1998 and it gave its first report about harmful tax practices in the member 
states and their dependencies in 1999 (Primarolo report). Even though the Group has been 
working for 15 years, there are stil l major problems in making the tax regimes work equally 
well in the EU, as was recently demonstrated by the numerous tax deals that the 
government of Luxemburg is alleged to have done with big corporations (Wayne et al. 2014).  
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Table 1. Timeline of the developments in the EU 
20.03.1996 Taxation in the European Union: Discussion Paper by the Commission 
01.12.1997 
Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council meeting concerning taxation policy: Code 
of Conduct for business taxation adopted, call for a STD 
10.10.2001 Commission communication about tax policy in the EU 
03.06.2003 Council Directive on taxation of savings income (STD) 
01.07.2005 The Savings Tax Directive comes to an effect 
13.11.2008 Commission proposes amendments to the STD 
02.02.2009 Commission proposes administrative cooperation in the field of taxation 
15.02.2011 
Council Directive on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation 
(2011/16/EU) Includes income, savings income, director’s fees, certain life 
insurance products, pensions and immovable property 
04.03.2011 ECOFIN agrees to the proposal of revised STD 
27.06.2012 
Commission Communication on concrete ways to reinforce the fight against 
tax fraud and tax evasion including in relation to third countries  
06.12.2012 
Commission Recommendation on aggressive tax planning  
Commission Recommendation regarding measures intended to encourage 
third countries to apply minimum standards of good governance in tax matters 
An action plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion 
01.01.2013 
Administrative cooperation (2011/16/EU) implemented in national laws and 
regulations 
12.06.2013 
Commission proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU 
as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of 
taxation. This time also dividends, capital gains, and other financial income 
and account balances will be made part of the automatic exchange system. 
24.03.2014 Council Directive of the revised STD (ECOFIN 2014a) 
14.10.2014 
ECOFIN agrees to Commission’s proposal to extend the reach of automatic 
exchange of information to include dividends, capital gains, and other financial 
income and account balances. 
01.12.2014 
ECOFIN adopts revised directive on mandatory automatic exchange of 
information (ECOFIN 2014b) 
01.01.2016 The revised STD comes to an effect 
30.09.2017 Revised Directive on automatic exchange of information will come to an effect. 
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5. Analysis  
5.1. Introduction 
We shall begin the Analysis by introducing each of the documents that we are discussing 
and putting each one into context. We shall then proceed to discuss the policy narrative 
apparent in each of our chosen EU documents before comparing and contrasting their 
characteristics.   
 
After considering the characteristics of recent EU documents we will compare them to an 
earlier narrative used by the EU. For this purpose we will use Sharman’s (2008) narrative 
which he calls the ‘Global Imperative’. Even though we are using Roe’s framework for 
presenting the policy narrative, we would like to remind the reader that unlike in Roe’s model 
type of narrative policy analysis (1994:Appendix 1) we are not finding the narratives through 
interviewing policy makers but by reviewing the official policy documents produced by the 
EU institutions. We are not making comparisons between current narratives, instead we are 
looking into how the official EU policy narrative has changed through the years. 
 
Secondly we go on to ask why these changes have occurred. There are two different 
approaches to answer this question. Our first approach shall discuss the external factors that 
have been partially responsible for the renewed interest in tax havens. We will consider the 
narrative changes that have occurred because the EU has been forced to react to these 
external factors and position these alterations in the wider context of international taxation. 
For example we shall analyse how the sovereign debt crisis has impacted on the EU’s tax 
policy narratives. The second approach to this problem focuses on de-/re-/politicisation. In 
order to do this we need to reject the idea that changes in the policy narratives have taken 
place solely because of external changes. We argue that the current situation is not an 
entirely unique political and economic environment for the EU. We will present some of the 
key developments within the EU that have caused active depoliticisation of taxation and 
other economic issues. In other words we will present the ways in which the issues 
regarding tax havens were depoliticised. Only then we can present the ways it has been 
currently repoliticised.  
 
Finally, we also need to analyse what changes the EU are suggesting and if these 
suggestions have been addressed. Has only repoliticisation occurred or has there been 
further depoliticisation at the same time? These phenomena do not exclude each other and 
can occur simultaneously on the same topic but at different levels.  
5.2. The Crucial Consolidation Narrative  
This section discusses four documents that were published by the European Commission in 
2012. These documents discuss tax fraud, tax evasion and tax havens and we shall highlight 
their key characteristics in order to analyse the policy narrative that has been recently 
constructed by the European Commission. We shall draw on the work of Roe and Radaelli 
as described in our Theoretical Framework in order to do this. Furthermore we shall discuss 
how the EU views the problem of tax havens and related issues such as tax evasion, fraud 
and avoidance. We shall also consider how it demonstrates actions that it has taken, are 
taking and will take, taking into Radaelli’s argument that “[t]he temporal order of events (or 
sequentiality) is a fundamental property of narratives” and this is what determines the plot 
opposed to is truthful or fallacious elements (1999:663). So therefore it is important for us to 
consider how the EU depicts its actions over time.  
 
As we stated in the European Union and Taxation chapter, the Commission represents the 
interests of the Union as a whole. Therefore we believe that a policy narrative analysis of 
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their communication and recommendation papers would give the closest representation of a 
recent unified EU policy narrative of the issue. For consistency purposes we only used 
documents from the Commission.      
5.2.1. The Documents 
The first document we shall discuss is the European Commission’s communication ‘on 
concrete ways to reinforce the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion including in relation to 
third parties’. This was published on 27.6.12 in response to the European Council’s call on 
the Council and the Commission to develop new measures to improve the fight against tax 
fraud and tax evasion, including in relation to third countries and was produced for the 
Council and the Parliament. We shall refer to this document as EC 2012a.  
 
The following three documents were all published on 06.12.12 elaborating on the content of 
EC 2012a. The mother document that was produced on this date was a communication to 
the Parliament and the Council entitled ‘An Action Plan to strengthen the fight against tax 
fraud and tax evasion’. We shall refer to this document as EC 2012b. The third and fourth 
documents accompanied the action plan and are both recommendations by the Comission. 
The first one ‘regarding measures intended to encourage third countries to apply minimum 
standards of good governance in tax matters’ is referred to as EC 2012c and the second ‘on 
aggressive tax planning’ is referred to as EC 2012d.  
5.2.2. Application of the term ‘tax haven’ within the documents 
Whilst we have set out to analyse the Commission's current policy narrative, with an 
emphasis on tax havens, this has been challenging to do as it is somewhat conservative with 
applying the term in their publications. Out of all the four documents that we analysed, the 
term is only used extensively in EC 2012a where it appears 11 times. In EC 2012b it is only 
used twice and in both 2014c and 2012d it does not appear at all. In the case of 2012c we 
feel that this is rather ironic as this document is intended to serve as a guideline for how the 
member states should behave in relation to third countries regarding tax issues.     
 
In section 7 (EC 2012b:5) the Commission presents new initiatives that are part of the action 
plan. It recommend measures by which member states should interact with third parties 
including jurisdictions that do not ‘comply with minimum standards of good governance in tax 
matters….commonly considered as tax havens’ (EC 2012b:5). They depict such jurisdictions 
as potentially damaging to all member states, claiming that all the tax bases of the members 
are eroded when tax havens and member states with relaxed tax regulations interact. Whilst 
they apply the common label of ‘tax havens’ in the action plan (EC 2012b), in the actual 
recommendation paper (EC 2012c) the term is not used once. This recommendation uses 
very similar language and therefore it is obvious as to what the Commission is referring to. 
Whilst discussing states that offer low levels of income tax they argue that such jurisdictions 
often also lack transparency or information exchange with other states, providing them with 
“shelter” from the tax administration of their existing state (EC 2012c:2).   
 
In contrast to how little they use the term ‘tax haven’ in the documents that we have 
analysed, we discovered that the Commission uses the term a lot more liberally on their 
relevant web pages. Furthermore the accompanying press release (EC 2012e) for 
documents EC 2012b, 2012c and 2012d uses the term explicitly. Its reluctance to use the 
term on official internal documents and its failure to address tax havens within the EU 
borders suggests that the issue is a sensitive one. Its liberal application of the term and 
clearly specified actions to the masses via the media suggests that it evidently wants to be 
perceived as addressing the tax haven issue actively. 
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Roe (1994:51) argues that “narratives can be representationally inaccurate and recgonisably 
so - but still persist ...’’. We appreciate that ‘tax havens’ may have detrimental effect on the 
EU member states. However the Commission appears to construct an ‘us vs them’ situation 
through the use of the term ‘third countries’, which subsequently suggests that member 
states do not adopt harmful tax practices. Indeed it argues (EC 2012c:2–3) “there is a 
consensus in the Union … that harmful tax measures are not acceptable, which makes it 
difficult for Member States to maintain to or introduce such measures.” Whilst it does not 
categorically state that such taxation policies within the member states do not exist, it 
evidently tries to distance itself from such practices.      
 
Furthermore, when it does refer to problems within its own jurisdictions, it does so very 
subtly and suggests that it must  address its own issues in order to gain more bargaining 
power with third countries opposed to recognising the fact that the tax practices of its own 
member states may also have ramifications on third countries. This is epitomised in 2012a 
(p.7). When discussing how enhanced cooperation could be achieved it argues that initially, 
existing tools should be strengthened. It continues to argue that:  
 
“The EU must demonstrate its ability to address these problems which will also put it in a 
stronger position to seek equivalent improvements from other countries.” (EC2012a:7). 
 
Therefore the narrative the Commission has constructed is reminiscent of Roe’s view that 
policy narratives can still be persistent regardless of whether or not they are representative 
of reality.       
5.2.3. Times of Instability 
Roe (1994:34) claims that the purpose of a policy narrative is to “underwrite” and “stabilize” 
the assumptions needed for decision-making in the face of what is genuinely uncertain and 
complex. This can be certainly seen in all four of the policy documents.  
 
As Radaelli (1999: 664) argues narratives “convey meaning and suggest action”. The need 
for such transformation is demonstrated in the four documents that we analysed. EC 2012d 
and EC 2012c are ‘recommendations’ created by the Commission whilst the titles of the two 
communication documents also reflect that a change is needed. EC 2012a (‘concrete ways 
to reinforce the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion…) suggests that the current practices 
that are in place are failing because of tax fraud and evasion and the solutions that they are 
proposing are unshakable foundations for a fairer tax system among the member states. 
Furthermore the name given to EC 2012b (‘An action plan to strengthen the fight against tax 
fraud and tax evasion’) suggests that is logical and detailed strategy that outlines the 
necessary requirements to enhance (‘strengthen’) the existing methods and procedures that 
aim to tackle tax fraud and evasion.   
 
Whilst the overall narrative voice cannot be construed as negative, all four policy documents 
do emit a feeling that the union is enduring a time of instability and if changes are not 
implemented then major ramifications will occur. For example it argues that the efficiency 
and effectiveness of tax collection is ‘desperately’ needed. The word ‘desperately’ suggests  
that the member states are in somehow endangered by its current tax collection practices 
and if changes are not implemented to these methods then severe consequences shall 
arise.  
 
Radaelli notes how Czarniawska (1997:12–13) claims that narratives “objectify a course of 
action and make it as independent from a specific actor’s preferences as a text from a 
speaker”. The Commission’s tone throughout the four policy documents is very much one of 
instruction and direction opposed to consideration. The Commission distances itself from the 
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earlier policies of the member states, and objectifies guidelines on how to leave the current 
situation of fiscal consolidation.  
5.2.4. References to the Past 
As highlighted in the introduction to this section, analysts stress the significance of a 
narrative’s chronological order of events as it is this that determines the plot opposed to 
truthful or fallacious elements of the story (Radaelli 1999:663). Banerjee (1999:2 in Radaelli 
1999:664) argues that “narratives begin in the past and end in the future”. Whilst the 
Commission does not make an explicit claim that the member states are in a time of 
economic peril, it does make several subtle comments near the beginning of each 
document, suggesting that they have enjoyed times of more economic prosperity and that 
the various tax issues it now faces were not as problematic. This is epitomised when it 
argues that “[i]n recent years, the challenge posed by tax fraud and evasion has increased 
considerably.” (EC 2012a:3). Furthermore it attributes this increased ‘challenge’ to the 
“globalisation of the economy, technological developments, the internationalisation of fraud 
and the resulting interdependence of Members States’ tax authorities” (EC2012:3). In the 
first sentence of its document on aggressive tax planning (EC 2012d:1), the Commission 
contrasts the tax planning of countries today to that of more traditional approaches. By 
referring to how tax planning structures are becoming ever more ‘sophisticated’, across 
different jurisdictions, it indicates that the issue is relatively new, being born out of 
globalisation. Such references to the past and descriptions of technological and structural 
change as described in these to examples construct an idea that we are now in an age 
where globalisation has created new taxation issues that will have serious counter-
productive impacts if they are not addressed.  
 
In 2012a, the Commission makes an indirect reference to the past in its second sentence by 
implying that the EU is in “times of fiscal consolidation” (p. 2). Although they do not explicitly 
refer to the past and how member states enjoyed more significant economic prosperity, this 
reference implicitly suggests that this was the case. The term ‘fiscal consolidation’ signifies 
that the EU sees its member states as enduring a time of economic uncertainty and 
attributes this to “tax fraud and evasion”, explaining that these two practices are “limiting the 
capacity of Member States” to “raise revenues and carry out economic policy” (Ibid.:2).   
5.2.5. International Cooperation 
Radaelli (1999:664) argues that policy narratives make “problems amenable to human 
action” and the Commission repeatedly state that in order to tackle contemporary tax issues 
created by tax havens, a coordinated effort between the member states and third countries 
is required. Phrases such as “Member States can only address this problem effectively if 
they work together” (EC 2012b:3) are common throughout the four documents, 
demonstrating that the issue of tax havens and the issues that they facilitate can only be 
addressed with a coordinated approach by the member states. They also place a large 
emphasis on standardising methods and approaches across the union, such as using the 
same information exchange forms (EC 2012a:12).  
 
Furthermore they highlight the importance of extending this coordinated approach beyond 
the union to third countries. Referring to new initiatives employed by the US Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act  (FATCA) and the OECD Global Forum, the commission states that 
“Recent developments at international level … open new perspectives for strengthening 
automatic information exchange between Member States and third countries” (2012a:11). 
However, the Commission does not settle for the mere following of the international 
developments, instead it wants to be at the forefront of international tax coordination. Across 
the four documents it repeatedly stresses its desires to promote its standards and practices. 
A prime example is in EC 2012c (p.3) where it states: 
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In its relations with third countries the Union has sought to convince them to 
subscribe to the Union principles concerning transparency and exchange of 
information (similar to the broadly accepted international standards for 
transparency and exchange of information) and the abolition of harmful tax 
measures as described in Commission Communication on promoting good 
governance in tax matters and Commission Communication on tax and 
development cooperation with developing countries on promoting good 
governance in tax matters.  
 
This demonstrates that the EU wants to lead by example in the field of international tax 
coordination and it is wants to impose its own standards on the rest of the world, especially 
jurisdictions with ‘harmful tax measures’. This paragraph encapsulates the image of right vs 
wrong that the EU seems to construct when discussing international tax issues. This is 
reminiscent of Banerjee’s claim (1999:2) “a narrative frames a situation in a way that makes 
one action and not others sensible”. For the jurisdictions who do not conform to the EU’s 
ideals then they recommend that the member states place them on a blacklist (EC 2012c:4-
5) until they comply with the EU’s vision of acceptable practices. This further emphasises 
Banerjee’s (1999:2) claim.       
5.2.6. Crucial Consolidation Narrative 
We shall name the narrative construed by the Commission in 2012 the ‘Crucial 
Consolidation’ narrative. It illustrates how member states are enduring times of economic 
turbulence and  that the only way to tackle today’s international tax issues is through 
enhanced unity between the member states and with third parties. Member states cannot 
address the issues of international tax fraud, evasion, avoidance and aggressive tax 
planning (facilitated by tax havens) alone. It is crucial that they exit these turbulent times 
otherwise even further ramifications shall transpire amongst the member states. Addressing 
its contemporary tax issues collectively and consolidating fiscal revenues will result in times 
of more economic prosperity. This will only be achieved if member states additionally work in 
conjunction with non member states. 
 
Standardising practices across member states (such as in the case of information exchange) 
will enable subsequently to put the EU into a position where they can extend these uniform 
measures to jurisdictions outside of the member states. Only once this is achieved would it 
be able to implement its idea of imposing ‘good governance’ in tax matters outside of the 
Union.   
 
The idea of being at the forefront of the international tax transformation is clearly important to 
the Commission. They highlight through the cases of FATCA and the OECD that 
international taxation measures are changing. It is important that the EU is a key actor in 
orchestrating such key transformations.  
 
Key characteristics of the Crucial Consolidation Narrative: 
 
 globalised world 
 member states cannot act alone 
 need for unified action 
 need for urgent action 
 international developments are inevitable 
 a way out of the crisis  
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5.3. The Global Imperative 
As stated earlier, we will use Sharman’s (2008) article as the basis of our conception of 
policy narratives regarding tax havens used in the EU institutions prior to the set of 
documents that we analysed in our previous section. It needs to be noted that this narrative 
is not the narrative of the Commission, but the narrative followed by the member states. The 
narrative has its basis on a Commission Discussion Paper (EC 1996), but the policy 
outcomes coming out of this narrative were contrary to what the Commission had hoped for 
in its paper. This is the reason why the old narrative provides a good comparison point to the 
contemporary policy narrative. It could be seen as a learning experience for the Commission 
(even though the commissioners have changed twice between the narratives) for creating a 
narrative that resonates in other EU institutions (in this case, the Council). 
 
According to the Global Imperative, a country cannot maintain high taxation levels in a world 
of mobile capital since the owner of the capital can simply move their assets to a different, 
low-taxation country. This idea is then brought to a regional level in the EU by stating that: 
 
unless non-Member States introduced equivalent [low] tax measures, 
investors would simply avoid new taxes and regulations by relocating their 
money outside the EU. Because of the mobility of capital, not only would the 
original tax evasion problem remain unresolved, but the competitiveness of 
EU financial industries would also be seriously damaged (Sharman 
2008:1050). 
 
This approach results in the narrowing of policy options for political actors in the member 
states. If there is no truly global solution to the problem, a single member state simply cannot 
maintain its higher tax levels, let alone set them higher than before. On the contrary, it 
should consider lowering these levels in order to attract more capital from other member 
states and third countries. It implies that unless all the countries in the world apply the same 
taxation measures, it is impossible to react to the relocation of capital without having a 
negative impact on an actor’s own economy. Hence, the EU cannot act on its own because 
the actions would not make the initial problem go away but instead it would further decrease 
collected tax revenues (Ibid.). The Global Imperative effectively tied the hands of any actor 
who wanted to make changes to the taxation system at the time since it is impossible to 
force other jurisdictions to lower their tax levels in an international system that is based on 
state sovereignty.  
 
The Global Imperative’s idea of globalisation is the same as in what Bruff (2005:262–5) 
refers to as the first wave of globalisation literature. According to that body of literature “the 
state is severely compromised as an actor in the domestic political economy” (Bruff 
2005:263). Bruff argues that most of these compromises to state power were exaggerated, 
but by generating these arguments one could create more power for globalisation in the form 
of a strong narrative (Ibid. 269). This demonstrates what substantial influence a policy 
narrative can have on the real world. Sharman (2008) argues that the Global Imperative was 
influential in EU policy making from the onset of the millennium until 2008, the time he wrote 
his article. We agree with Sharman’s argument, however, as we have demonstrated in the 
first part of our analysis we argue that the Commission has constructed a new narrative that 
has displaced Global Imperative in EU decision making bodies. 
5.3.1. Differences between the Global Imperative and Crucial Consolidation 
narratives 
As the name suggests, the Global Imperative was an idea that forced states to follow a 
certain line of action. Sharman argues that there was no way for a single actor to address 
the problem of capital mobility alone. The only way to solve the problem would be to engage 
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in global cooperation but this option was depicted as unfeasible (Sharman 2008:1054–5). 
This resulted in a situation where there were only two possible outcomes. Either a perfect 
solution that included all the actors, or maintaining the status quo with the same systemic 
features of the global economy. Since there was nothing between these two options, it was 
extremely hard to imagine any changes to the situation.  
 
The Crucial Consolidation narrative demonstrates that there is a possibility to move between 
these two options. It suggests that development in this area is a gradual process which 
occurs over prolonged period of time. The EU can act as the first mover, creating a 
possibility to other actors to follow suit. The Council conformed to the same narrative when 
presenting the new information exchange directive: the EU is “leading by example in the 
international arena” (ECOFIN 2014c). This means that even though the ultimate goal is 
global cooperation in tax matters, some countries have to take the first steps in order to 
achieve this. This circumvents the Global Imperative’s black-and-white perspective where 
there is either a perfect transition or no change at all.  
 
It is important to point out here, that the Commission document on which Sharman bases the 
Global Imperative narrative has a strong call for European cooperation in the face of a 
globalised world (EC 1996:10–11). As Sharman notes, the Global Imperative 
“simultaneously represented an external economic imperative for the EU to act, while also 
invalidating the possibility of any EU response” (2008:1053). All the actors, then and now, 
seem to conform to the same conclusion that it is impossible for member states to act alone 
in a world of mobile capital. The Commission has consistently (from 1996-2012) flipped this 
argument to promote enhanced cooperation amongst member states, in order to have more 
room to manoeuvre in the globalised world. However, the policy decisions made by the 
member states (as seen in the work of the Council) conformed to the idea that regional 
cooperation is just as impossible as independent state action in a globalised world. The 
developments leading to the amendment of the STD and the information exchange directive 
however, show that the member states are now more willing to adhere to regional 
cooperation and step into the grey zone between the Global Imperative’s black and white 
options.   
 
The second differentiating feature between the narratives is the relation to the past, future, 
and the current situation. Whereas the Global Imperative is passive, the Crucial 
Consolidation calls for change as a necessity. According to the Global Imperative change is 
not necessary, since the economic system functions properly enough even with some 
apparent flaws. Even the Commission, which promoted cooperation in tax issues, stated that 
markets have gained from the different tax regimes within the EU and there has not been 
overall losses in the economy (EC 1996:10). This links to the discussion of productive tax 
havens mentioned in our Contextualisation: even though the Global Imperative 
acknowledges that tax havens provide a way to avoid taxes, it does not automatically mean 
that they are a bad phenomenon. By avoiding full tax rates, individuals can choose where 
and how to invest the sum that a higher tax rate would have deducted from them. In other 
words, the economy does not lose as a whole, there is only a change in who is in the 
position to invest the money saved by the use of tax havens.  
 
The Crucial Consolidation does not associate tax havens with any positive connotations. The 
current global economic climate is depicted as dangerous; unstable and unpredictable. It is 
important to make changes to the tax systems so that the governments of the member 
states are more prepared and better equipped to safeguard their citizens from this 
dangerous economy. Additionally, the use of tax havens is presented as an unfair activity 
and it is argued that tax havens cause direct damage to the member states (EC 2012b:5). 
The Commission states that it is not irrelevant who invests the money, since the states need 
to maintain a  stable level of tax revenues: “all tax payers suffer when tax rates are raised to 
make up for eroding tax bases” (EC 2012a:12). They argue that such erosion occurs 
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because of investment in tax havens and any advantages that the member states enjoy 
must not be ‘undermined through action taken by third parties’ (EC 2012a: 12). According to 
the Crucial Consolidation the current economic reality is not only unpreferable, but it also 
calls for change. This change is already foreseeable and this is why the changes to the tax 
systems need to be implemented immediately, the member states cannot afford to wait any 
longer. 
5.4. What explains the change? 
We have now concluded that there is a change in the way the EU addresses the issue of tax 
havens. The next step is to understand why this change came about. There are two different 
approaches to explain the changes: firstly, they can only be seen as responses to external 
developments. Secondly, one can argue that the EU or the forces in the EU effectively 
depoliticised the issue, which resulted in the maintenance of the status quo regarding tax 
havens. We shall begin by examining the exogenous factors before presenting the second 
approach in the next section of our analysis entitled Possible De/Re-politicisation factors. 
5.4.1.  Progress made on the international level 
The first external factor is the change taking place on the international level. Both the US 
and the OECD have made new initiatives in the area of international tax reform. The new US 
tax law called FATCA is said to “open new perspectives” in the ways in which the EU can 
tackle the tax haven problem (EC 2012a:11). Since the US has been able to do something 
unilaterally, it is not anymore possible to believe in the barriers for action set by the Global 
Imperative. The FATCA has shown that there is a way to address the problem without a 
global consent on how to do it (for more details about FATCA, see e.g. Kaye 2014).  
 
Besides the developments in the US, the OECD is the second and arguably even more 
important concrete example of an actor in international development on tax issues. The 
Commission states that the OECD has been successful in launching the Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (EC 2012a:12). This success 
indicates that progressive change is occurring and the international taxation landscape is 
changing. This suggests that progression is being made on issue of tax havens and the 
problems that they facilitate. This makes it easier for the member states to agree with the 
short-term losses linked with creating more transparent and efficient taxation systems in the 
EU.  
5.4.2. The Sovereign Debt Crisis 
The biggest change in the economic and political environment since the time the 
Commission wrote their Discussion Paper in 1996 was brought by the financial crisis in 
2007. The crisis that started first as sub-prime crisis in the American mortgage market 
changed to financial crisis and inevitably impacted upon Europe. The European 
governments had to increase their debt levels in order to help the financial institutions that 
were about to fail. This approach made the European public economies fragile and by 2011 
Europe faced a sovereign debt crisis that is still ongoing (Helleiner 2011a:69). This 
prolonged period of economic crisis is an exogenous factor that could cause changes in the 
policies made by the EU.  
 
In 2012 when these documents were published the sovereign debt crisis was at its peak and 
this is consequently reflected in the Crucial Consolidation narrative. It is depicted as an 
external influence from which the EU has to defend itself. In order to exit the crises changes 
to the international economic system are required. Therefore changes in the taxation system 
are more imaginable. Furthermore the crisis also makes the argument for reinforcing 
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member states’ tax bases more crucial since the majority of the EU member states are 
heavily indebted and struggle to maintain balanced budgets.  
5.5.  De-/repoliticisation 
Our second approach to explaining the change in the narratives is to focus on the concepts 
of politicisation, depoliticisation and repoliticisation. This is a necessary approach if we want 
to reject the idea that external factors automatically cause a change in policies. For example 
the idea that restricted fiscal revenues is a unique phenomenon to the member states and 
thus urges them to conform to the need of change is incorrect: it is hard to imagine a 
situation where a country would not embrace bigger tax revenue, even if it was economically 
in a strong position. Instead of automatic causality there must be actors exploiting the new 
political environment and creating the initiative for change (Radaelli 1999:665–6). It also 
means focusing on why the change did not occur earlier. In other words we will examine the 
ways in which the issue of tax havens was depoliticised in this period before the change in 
narratives. 
 
We have argued that there is a definite change in the EU’s policy narrative concerning 
possibilities of action regarding tax havens. We now attempt to answer why this change 
ocurred at that particular moment in time. We shall discuss how the need for reform was 
downplayed with the help of the Global Imperative narrative. Jessop’s article about re-/de-
/politicisation is important in this regard, since we intend to show how the problem was 
depoliticised before the change in the EU’s narrative ensued.  
5.5.1. Politicisation 
Referring back to Palonen in the Theoretical Framework chapter, every issue needs to be 
politicised before we can start the analysis of depoliticisation. It is rather hard to define a 
moment when tax issues were politicised for the first time on the EU level but as Radaelli 
(1999:668) argues, harmful cross-border tax practices taking place within the EU were 
brought to wider attention in 1996 when Ecofin had an informal meeting in Verona. Radaelli 
refers to the discussion paper written for this meeting (EC 1996) and the subsequent Ecofin 
conclusions on tax policy (ECOFIN 1998) as “The Narrative of Harmful Tax Competition” and 
argues that it was used by the Commission until the time he wrote the article 1. He states that 
the goal of the narrative was to create more co-operation on tax issues between the member 
states. 
 
Interestingly, it is the exact same document (EC 1996) that Sharman (2008) uses when he 
argues that Global Imperative prevents the EU to make any decisive reforms to their tax 
policies. In other words, the same document had two effects: it politicised the issue on the 
EU level but at the same time it was depoliticised as the reforms were considered as outside 
the realm of possibility. 
5.5.2. Depoliticisation 
In the previous section we came to the conclusion that tax havens were politicised on the EU 
level at the turn of the millennium. Different methods of depoliticisation meant that it took 
almost 20 years for any real developments on tax havens and their associated issues to 
occur. 
                                                                 
1
 This was a narrative used in the EU and is not to be confused with the OECD campaign a gainst harmful tax 
competition which was ongoing at the time.  
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Level of Polity: Shifting the Responsibility 
According to Jessop, depoliticisation can be achieved by shifting the decision making power 
to another part of the polity, or even outside of it (2014:212–3). For years the EU struggled to 
implement a comprehensive information exchange system between the member states, 
aiming to remove the secrecy jurisdictions within its borders. These jurisdictions (namely 
Luxembourg, Belgium and Austria) refused to change their banking secrecy laws as long as 
some other countries (outside the EU) still had similar laws in place (Sharman 2008:1057). 
Luxembourg and Austria blocked automatic information exchange agreements until the 
beginning of 2014, when the EU negotiations with these third countries had proceeded to the 
stage of agreement on automatic information exchange (Fontanella-Khan & Barker 2014). 
Only after that was the Council able to adopt a more comprehensive information exchange 
directive (ECOFIN 2014b).  
 
This condition was an efficient act of depoliticisation since it transferred the decision making 
authority outside the EU borders. At the same time Luxembourg and Austria rejected any EU 
sanctions against Switzerland (one of the third countries in question) for not joining the 
information agreement system (Sharman 2008:1064). These two member states were able 
to firstly shift the decision out of the reach of EU politicians and secondly prevent political 
pressure from the EU to these third countries.  
Level of Politics: Constitutionalism 
According to the Global Imperative, capital is mobile in a globalised world and there is 
nothing the EU or its member states can do about it. Subsequently member states have no 
means to prevent tax avoiders from sending and receiving money to and from tax havens. 
The same member states are enforcing the mobility of capital in the Union through the most 
important legal document it has, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). This parallels a depoliticisation method called constitutionalism. As described in our 
Theoretical Framework, constitutionalism is the act of consolidating a deeply politicised issue 
by writing it into constitution (or in the case of the EU: into a treaty). Subsequently altering 
the issue becomes significantly harder than before, requiring special parliamentary 
procedures (Jessop 2014:214–5). By enforcing the TFEU the member states maintain the 
mobility of borderless capital. Therefore it is paradoxical that the member states see their 
room for manoeuvre in fiscal policies limited by the same global political economy they 
created. It is misleading to suggest that changing the current globalised reality is out of the 
reach of political actors in the EU member states. If there is a sufficient amount of political 
will, the agreements made by politicians can also be altered by them. However, since the 
free movement of capital is constitutionalised it is significantly harder to prevent or even 
hinder the movement of capital since it would mean breaking the Treaty.  
 
The taxation issues are not the only ones depoliticised through constitutionalism. The 
creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was responsible for an increase on 
literature written about constitutionalism in the EU (e.g. Bieler & Morton 2001). Gill uses his 
analogous concept of new constitutionalism to refer to the integration processes of the EU. 
By this he means the separation of “economic policies from broad political accountability in 
order to make governments more responsive to the discipline of market forces and 
correspondingly less responsive to popular-democratic forces and processes” (2001:47)2. 
This form of depoliticisation is also apparent in the formation of the European Central Bank 
(Gill 2001; Major 2012).  
Level of Politics: use of expert advice  
Another measure of depoliticisation explained by Jessop is the use of expert help when 
trying to come to a conclusion in a political issue (2014:215). The reason for requesting 
                                                                 
2
 Gill  has written about new constiutionalism also in other settings than only the EU, see e.g. Gill  1992 and 
1995. 
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assistance from non-political actors is to get a non-political opinion on the matter, therefore 
rendering the issue apolitical. Taxation policies are extremely important to the private sector 
since they have a significant influence on their business environment and creating taxation 
systems that are functional for business is important. The EU has asked the accounting and 
consulting company PricewaterhouseCoopers to “contribute to the debate on taxation in the 
European Union” (PwC 2012: Taxation paper No 31). However, this cannot be considered 
the wisest of selections as the the same company is alleged to have facilitated a massive tax 
evasion scheme in Luxembourg (Wayne et al. 2014). Regardless of whether the allegations 
are true or not, using one of the biggest accounting companies in the world in the process of 
creating new solutions to tax issues is an example of depoliticisation through the use of 
expert advice. 
 
Level of Policies: Addressing tax havens  
Our earlier part of analysis discussed the fact that the EU is reluctant to address the problem 
of tax havens per se. They are more focused on addressing tax evasion and tax fraud, 
concepts that are constantly repeated in the analysed policy papers. Whilst the EU is having 
a public campaign against tax evasion and tax fraud (see the EC website: Fight against tax 
fraud and tax evasion), it does not have one against tax havens. There is no official list of 
jurisdictions that the EU would consider tax havens3. The policy recommendation created by 
the Commission in order to deal with these jurisdictions does not apply the term ‘tax haven’ 
once. The recommended methods for sanctioning “third countries which do not meet 
minimum standards of good governance in tax matters” only include maintaining national 
blacklists and possibly re-negotiating bilateral double taxation conventions (EC 2012c:4–5). 
Not having an EU-wide campaign against tax havens is an act of depoliticisation on the 
policy level. 
 
The OECD launched a campaign against harmful tax competition in 1998, but it was soon 
forgotten and let go by 2001. According to Sharman (2006) the biggest reason for the failure 
of the campaign is the way in which the OECD lost the rhetoric battle against tax havens. By 
attacking the tax havens’ preferential tax policies and demanding that they change, the 
OECD was presented as the club of rich and powerful countries that tried to force small and 
in some cases developing countries to change their policies. The only way the OECD was 
able to sanction the tax havens was to create a blacklist of jurisdictions that did not conform 
to good standards on tax policies. Whilst the OECD’s campaign was titled a ‘campaign 
against harmful tax competition’, the tax havens reversed the challenge and argued that the 
OECD countries are waging this campaign since they are not able to compete against tax 
havens’ more efficient tax policies. In addition, the tax havens had one more influential 
argument against the OECD’s campaign: it only addressed jurisdictions that were not OECD 
countries, even though the definition used by the OECD could have also been applied to 
some of the OECD countries such as Luxembourg and Switzerland. Not being able to 
address the problem inside the OECD before starting a campaign against countries outside 
of it made was a predominant factor in its failure (Sharman 2006:1–11) 
 
The reasons why we deviated from the EU level to the OECD level are the apparent lessons 
the EU have learned from the OECD’s campaign. Firstly, the unsuccessful campaign 
depoliticised the concepts of tax havens and tax competition. The term ‘tax haven’ is so 
vague and controversial term that its use in official policy papers is still difficult. No 
jurisdiction would refer to itself as a tax haven, and since the OECD blacklists gradually 
emptied there is no agreed international definition or listing of jurisdictions considered to be 
‘tax havens’. Hence a campaign against tax havens is a campaign against nobody. The 
second concept, tax competition, has also been forgotten from the official EU policy papers. 
The OECD stopped using the concept during their original campaign and switched to the 
                                                                 
3
 An EU blacklist has been requested by the EP, but without a result this far (EP 2013). 
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concept of harmful tax practices (Sharman 2006:19). Secondly, waging a direct campaign 
against tax havens is risky and possibly backfires as long as some of the EU member states 
can be defined as tax havens themselves.  
5.5.3. Repoliticisation 
Earlier we discussed how the issue of tax havens was depoliticised on different levels on the 
EU agenda. As our research premise states, the issue has now been repoliticised. The key 
to repoliticising the issue was to persist with the same implicit methods used to depoliticise it. 
The Commission came up with an Action Plan and accompanying recommendations that did 
not address the tax havens directly, it focused upon the issues that they facilitate. They did 
not launch a specific campaign against these ‘third countries that do not comply with good 
governance in tax matters’. They addressed the matter as part of a wider campaign against 
tax evasion and tax fraud. The Commission argues that these two problems must be tackled 
on three different levels: 
 
i) the tax collection within each Member State must be improved.  
ii) there is a need to enhance cross-border cooperation between Member States' tax 
administrations. 
iii) the EU needs to have a clear and coherent policy vis-à-vis third countries in order to 
promote its standards at international level and ensure a level playing field. Co-operating at 
EU level has an added value in each of these three fields. (EC 2012a:3). 
 
As displayed above the issue of tax havens would fall on the third level. By ensuring that 
they have not placed an emphasis solely on tax havens, they are tackling them through a 
wider campaign on tax fraud and evasion and thus are able to repoliticise the issue on tax 
havens in a more subtle way than had they addressed them directly. Through these aims, 
coupled with a narrative that was based on the necessity for change and leaned heavily on 
the notion of international developments regarding the issue, the Commission was able to 
change the member states’ perception of the matter and its possible solutions. The reason 
why regional cooperation was successfully transformed into a potential solution was the 
dissolution of the Global Imperative narrative. This happened through the aforementioned 
international developments: when the US introduced the FATCA it became apparent that the 
hypothesis of impossibility of unilateral (or regional) action to tackle the problem of tax 
evasion through tax havens was not accurate. The member states and other political actors 
in the EU that held onto the Global Imperative narrative were left with invalid arguments and 
the supporters of the Crucial Consolidation gained more leverage.  
 
Since it was not politically amenable to fight the tax havens, the Commission turned to 
fighting tax evasion and tax fraud instead. The EU does not act as a unified front calling for a 
change in the tax policies of tax havens, instead it is trying to implement international 
systems and technical fixes (like the automatic information exchange systems), which would 
remove the predominant characteristics of tax havens such as secrecy. This approach is 
more implicit and less political than the OECD’s campaign (1998–2001). The means to 
accomplish these new systems of information exchange are essentially political, including 
negotiating third countries to sign the agreement, pressurising member states to conform to 
the new tax practices, and working together with the OECD in designing an international 
information exchange agreement system. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This project has focused on jurisdictions that attract large amounts of foreign direct 
investment by offering low rates of taxation and/or strong banking secrecy laws. These 
jurisdictions are commonly known as ‘tax havens’. High profile cases of corporate entities 
using tax havens in order to evade or avoid tax over the past several years (e.g. the case of 
Vodafone from 2009; see BBC 2010), has thrust the issue of tax justice into the public’s 
consciousness. This has also resulted in the formation of non-governmental organisations 
highlighting the problems posed by tax havens, such as Tax Justice Network. This issue has 
gained more recognition on political agendas. 
 
We set on a task to find out why and how the issue of tax havens has been repoliticised on 
the EU’s political agenda. First we tracked the changes in the policy narratives used by the 
EU and especially the Commission. After ascertaining the change we indicated in which 
ways the issue was depoliticised and subsequently repoliticised in the EU policymaking 
institutions. 
 
Our policy narrative analysis of the four EU documents highlighted how the Commission 
depicts the member states as being part of a globalised world which is enduring a time of 
instability and it is crucial to leave this stage behind. Only through coordination are they able 
to exit this prolonged period of economic turbulence. It is not possible for the member states 
to do this alone. The Commission argues that an increase in member states’ fiscal revenue 
is an essential feature of achieving economic stability. One way of consolidating the fiscal 
revenue is the strengthening of tax bases by addressing the problems of tax evasion and tax 
fraud. This must be achieved through the creation of an EU-wide multi-level response. We 
have named this policy narrative the Crucial Consolidation. 
 
Our first working question asked: How has the EU changed the way it addresses the issue of 
tax evasion and tax havens? In order to answer this we needed to find an earlier narrative 
that discusses tax havens and the issues associated with them. We achieved this by using 
the work of Jason Sharman (2008) where he argues that a policy narrative called Global 
Imperative was influential in the EU policy making institutions from the turn of the millennium 
up until the writing of the article in 2008. We presented the two key differences between the 
Global Imperative and the Crucial Consolidation narratives, which were the positioning of the 
EU in relation to the past, present and future, and the imagined possibility of a regional 
solution to a global problem. These differences explain the ways in which the EU has 
changed the way it addresses the issue of tax evasion and tax havens. Whilst the previous 
narrative argued that there was no way to address the tax haven dilemma regionally, the 
updated narrative depicts that such a change can be facilitated efficiently.  
 
The differences between the two narratives provide us with the answers to our second 
working question: What courses of action do the EU see as realistic and unrealistic? 
Whereas the Global Imperative did not see a feasible regional solution, the Crucial 
Consolidation demonstrates that there is achievable middle ground between a perfect 
solution and no change at all. The fact that the Council has adopted directives ECOFIN 
2014a and 2014b shows that they adhere to the Crucial Consolidation narrative. This 
justifies our argument that the EU is following the Crucial Consolidation, not only the 
Commission. The EU knows that it cannot have a direct influence on the tax policies of tax 
havens. Therefore they are pursuing strategies that gradually take their advantages away 
from them. For example the automatic information exchange agreement intend to eliminate 
the possibility to maintain secrecy jurisdictions. The Commission places lot of emphasis on 
the EU’s role on the forefront of designing universal administrative methods and practices 
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that facilitate “good governance in tax matters”. Through encouragement they hope that non 
member states adopt these ideals and administrative methods and practices. 
 
This leads us to answer our third working question: What are the tangible actions the EU has 
already taken in order to address the issue? The adoption of the directive ECOFIN 2104b 
will create a comprehensive and most importantly automatic information exchange system 
between the member states’ tax authorities. At the same time the EU has been designing a 
more international system with the OECD. The OECD system was signed by more than 50 
countries, giving the information exchange agreement far wider international influence than 
what would be possible only through EU directives (OECD.org). The Commission has also 
been negotiating bilateral information exchange agreements with European third countries 
(Switzerland, Andorra, Monaco, Liechtenstein, and San Marino - these jurisdictions are 
commonly recognised as tax havens). When these agreements come to an effect in 2017 
they will significantly decrease the possibilities for signatory countries to maintain strong 
secrecy jurisdictions. 
 
Our fourth research question asked has the EU identified tax havens inside its own borders? 
As discussed in our policy narrative analysis, the Commission fails to mention that it has 
jurisdictions that do not comply with ‘minimum standards of good governance in tax matters’ 
within its boundaries. It is not surprising that it fails to disclose such jurisdictions as their 
message would appear somewhat hypocritical. Several calls for the need of unified front and 
unified actions give an impression that there are still some member states that do not comply 
with the minimum standards of tax policies  
In conclusion, these working questions help us to answer our research question: Why has 
the issue of tax havens been repoliticised on the European Union’s economic and political 
agenda? As argued in our Analysis, the external factors had an impact on the way how the 
Commission compiled their Crucial Consolidation narrative. The sovereign debt crisis did not 
lead to calls for changes to international tax reform on its own, however it was certainly 
instrumental in creating stronger arguments for change.   
The developments regarding international taxation were the crucial factors for a 
repoliticisation of the issue of tax havens. According to Sharman and the Global Imperative, 
it was impossible to have anything else other than a global solution to the problem. However 
as demonstrated by the FATCA in the US this hypothesis was incorrect. It was impossible to 
keep the issue depoliticised at an EU level when such developments were taking place on 
the other side of the Atlantic. By employing subtle strategies and tactics the Commission has 
been able to introduce the issues regarding tax havens onto the EU’s economic and political 
agenda. By creating a campaign that addresses the issues of tax fraud and evasion, which 
includes both member and non-member states, it does not over emphasise other 
jurisdictions’ harmful policies that facilitate the two crimes. Instead it shifts the emphasis to 
the actions of tax evasion and tax fraud, and focuses on the elimination of significant 
advantages of these jurisdictions, such as banking secrecy. 
The EU has made undeniable progress in reforming the tax administrative and information 
systems within the member states. Starting from September 2017, all member states will 
automatically share information about taxable assets within each state’s jurisdiction 
(ECOFIN 2014b). In addition to the developments on the EU level, 2014 has also seen the 
creation of an OECD agreement on automatic information exchange that was signed by 
more than 50 countries. All this gives prospects for further development of international tax 
systems. However, not all the aspects relating to tax havens have been repoliticised. The EU 
still fails to firmly recognise the problems within its own borders and in the dependencies of 
its member states. Whilst they have chosen to tackle the problem with promoting greater 
transparency in the taxation systems inside and outside of the EU, they have not touched 
upon the root problems of tax havens. The EU nor the Commission do not try to unravel the 
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aspects of the global political economy which foster the birth and success of tax havens. 
Until these have been addressed, a definitive solution to the problem of tax havens will not 
be formulated and therefore we need to settle for the recent solutions that shall hopefully 
consolidate the EU against their threats.  
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7. Afterthought 
 
The topic of this project is very contemporay. The latest developments in the different EU 
directives and international agreements on the OECD level occurred during the time of 
writing (September - December 2014). Since these agreements and directives have only 
recently been signed and do not come into effect for several more years (2017) we are 
unable to comment on their effectiveness. Naturally if we were to write a similar project in the 
future, we would examine their success.  
 
As we stated in our Methodology, we feel that this topic could be enhanced by implementing 
a more comprehensive approach that investigates developments within each of the EU 
institutions. We only had the sufficient scope, time and resources to discuss the views of the 
European Commission. As we also mentioned previously, the Council meetings and work 
constructed in more informal settings would have served as a valuable addition to the study.  
 
In retrospect, in a situation where the topic and research design would have been clarified 
months before the deadline, it would have been interesting to conduct a fieldwork trip to 
Brussels to interview actors who are well versed in the workings of the Council and who 
could have given more information about the opinions of single member states and their 
representatives. The European Parliament’s sessions, opinions and remarks would have 
served as an interesting addition to the study. This would have enabled us to chart the 
opinions and developments inside the EU, possibly giving a more detailed account on how 
the topic progressed between the different institutions.  
 
Even though we have argued that the issue of tax havens has been repoliticised on the EU 
agenda, it still remains depoliticised in many respects. The Commission has been able to 
create the framework of an international tax cooperation system that makes the activity of 
tax evasion through tax havens more difficult than it was previously. This does not mean that 
all the problems related to the tax havens will be solved. For example the information 
exchange agreement is only the beginning of the tax system reform: the tax departments will 
have more information at their disposal but they need to devise ways in which to use this 
efficiently. 
 
As stated in our Analysis, the Commission depicts tax havens as potentially harmful to the 
member states by discussing how they erode their tax bases. However it does not recognise 
that such jurisdictions exist within its own borders, this is clearly a sensitive topic for the 
Commission and therefore it would be interesting area to investigate. We also discovered 
that it was reluctant to use the term ‘tax haven’ in some of the documents that we reviewed. 
However, on the contrary we discovered that the Commission used the term a lot more 
liberally on its website suggesting that it wants to be percieved by the public as being 
proactive on the matter. Therefore an extensive comparison of its public and private faces 
could also be a possible interesting area of study.   
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Appendix 1 
 
List of the EU Member States & Year of Entry 
 
 Austria (1995) 
 Belgium (1952) 
 Bulgaria (2007) 
 Croatia (2013) 
 Cyprus (2004) 
 Czech Republic (2004) 
 Denmark (1973) 
 Estonia (2004) 
 Finland (1995) 
 France (1952) 
 Germany (1952) 
 Greece (1981) 
 Hungary (2004) 
 Ireland (1973) 
 Italy (1952) 
 Latvia (2004) 
 Lithuania (2004) 
 Luxembourg (1952) 
 Malta (2004) 
 Netherlands (1952) 
 Poland (2004) 
 Portugal (1986) 
 Romania (2007) 
 Slovakia (2004) 
 Slovenia (2004) 
 Spain (1986) 
 Sweden (1995) 
 United Kingdom (1973) 
 
Candidate countries for Membership 
 
 Albania 
 Iceland 
 Montenegro 
 Serbia 
 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
 Turkey 
 
Potential Candidates for Membership 
 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 Kosovo 
 
Source - European Union official website http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm 
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Appendix 2 (Glossary) 
 
Administrative Cooperation Directive: From 2017, Member State tax authorities will 
automatically exchange information with each other on most categories of income and 
capital held by private individuals and certain entities. It is the widest possible scope of 
automatic exchange within Europe, to mirror the global standard of automatic information 
exchange agreed by the OECD. (ec.europa.eu) 
 
Aggressive tax planning: “the use of complex schemes of uncertainty legality to exploit 
taxation loopholes for the benefit of taxpayers who can afford the fees charged by 
professional advisers to create such arrangements” (Palan et al. 2010:249)   
 
Automatic Information Exchange Agreement (OECD): 51 jurisdictions signed a 
Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on 29.10.14. This agreement provides for 
exchange of all financial information on an annual basis, automatically. Most jurisdictions 
have committed to implementing this Standard on a reciprocal basis with all interested 
jurisdictions. (OECD.org)  
 
OECD Harmful Tax Competition Campaign: The Campaign was launched in 1996 as a 
response to the erosion of tax bases of higher tax countries. The project highlighted two 
broad categories of unacceptable behaviour: ‘harmful tax regimes’ and ‘tax havens’. The 
initiative intended to discourage the use of preferential tax regimes for foreign investors and 
to encourage effective information exchange among the tax authorities of different countries. 
As part of the initiative, the OECD produced a list of countries and territories that it deemed 
to be tax havens (Appendix 3). 
 
EU Savings Tax Directive (STD): “was adopted to ensure the proper operation of the 
internal market and tackle the problem of tax evasion. It was approved in 2003 and came 
into effect on July 1, 2005. The main method is exchange of information between tax 
authorities. However, an alternative withholding tax arrangements has been allowed for 
some countries, which intended to be provisional (Palan et al. 2010:250)   
 
Tax avoidance: “the gray area between tax compliance and tax evasion… [ ] … Strictly 
speaking, a tax avoiding individual or a company seeks to ensure that one of three things 
happens. First, they might seek to pay less tax than might be required by a reasonable 
interpretation of a country’s law. Second, they might hope that tax is paid on profits declared 
in a country other than where they were really earned. Third, they might arrange to pay tax 
somewhat later than the profits were earned.” (Palan et al. 2010:10)  
 
Tax evasion: “an illegal activity undertaken to reduce an individual or company’s tax bill. It 
occurs when a taxpayer fails to declare all or part of his or her income or makes a claim to 
offset an expense against taxable income that he or she did not incur or was not allowed to 
claim for tax purposes.” (Palan et al. 2010:9)  
 
Tax havens: “considered generally countries that offer one of the three facilities or a 
combination of all three: zero taxation for nonresidents; robust secrecy provisions and 
anonymity; easy, speedily and flexible rules of incorporation” (Palan et al 2010:251)  
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Appendix 3 (A List of Tax Havens Compiled by the OECD in 2000) 
 
Andorra 
Anguilla – Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Aruba – Kingdom of the Netherlands 
Commonwealth of the Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Barbados 
Belize 
British Virgin Islands – Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom 
Cook Islands – New Zealand 
The Commonwealth of Dominica 
Gibraltar – Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom 
Grenada 
Guernsey/Sark/Alderney– Dependency of the British Crown 
Isle of Man – Dependency of the British Crown 
Jersey – Dependency of the British Crown 
Liberia 
The Principality of Liechtenstein 
The Republic of the Maldives 
The Republic of the Marshall Islands 
The Principality of Monaco 
Montserrat – Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom 
The Republic of Nauru 
Netherlands Antilles – Kingdom of the Netherlands  
Niue – New Zealand 
Panama 
Samoa 
The Republic of the Seychelles 
St Lucia 
The Federation of St. Christopher & Nevis 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Tonga 
Turks & Caicos – Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom  
US Virgin Islands – External Territory of the United States 
The Republic of Vanuatu 
 
(OECD 2000:17) The list is based on the definition formulated for the OECD’s ‘Harmful Tax 
Competition’ (1998:22-23) 
 
